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I. INTRODUCTION
The 2000 presidential election focused attention on an idea that has
been surfacing for some time-the privatization of Social Security. 1

* Professor of Law, University of Nonh Carolina at Chapel Hill. The author
would like to thank Christopher T. Schulten, for his research assistance. particularly on
the Federal Thrift Savings Plan and John Kent for his research on the Australian
retirement system.
1. Calling All Swing States, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 20, 2000, at 110, 117 (describing
attacks by the campaign of Vice President Al Gore on the Bush proposals). Privatization
is already well under way for the pension accounts of government employees. The
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Long considered the "third rail" of politics, Social Security has
historically been immunized from debate or criticism concerning costs
or its value to society. That protective cover is now gradually being
lifted, and Social Security reform is becoming a topic that may be
responsibly discussed, even in a public forum. 2 Although opposition
remains fierce, proposals for privatization have been gradually gaining
acceptance as the inadequacy of benefits from the present system
become more apparent, and bankruptcy becomes certain in the absence
federal government's pension plan for civil service employees allows investments in
stocks and other securities. The level of benefits these employees receive upon
retirement will depend on the success of the investments they select. See infra notes
318-21 and accompanying text. State pension funds have for many years invested in
common stocks and other securities, and are allowing their employees increasingly to
select their own investments. Those individuals' retirements will be largely privatized
since they do not contribute to Social Security. See generally Paul Roye, Director, SEC
Division of Investment Management, Protecting Pension Plan Participants Through
Investor Education, Address Before the International Foundation of Employee Benefit
Plans (May 9, 2000), available at 2000 WL 563757 (S.E.C) (noting that several states,
including Florida, are considering or have already adopted defined contribution plans
that will allow state employees to make their own investment decisions). Europeans,
who have traditionally been the staunchest supporters of socialized pension schemes, arc
also considering reduction of the role of government in their retirement programs.
France has already adopted legislation for tax advantaged personal pension plans. John
Tagliabue, Europe Rethinks Its Pensions: A Search for Ways to Reduce the
Government's Role, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 2000, at Cl. Germany is planning to provide
for private pension plans that would partially privatize the current public pension system.
Christopher Rhoads, Germany ls Poised for a Pension Overhaul, WALL ST. J., May I0,
2001, at Al3. Chile already has a privatized social security system, and at least seven
other Latin American countries are adopting that model in one form or another. Clifford
Krauss, Social Security, Chilean Style; Pensioners Quiver as Markets Fall, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 16, 1998, § 4, at 4; see also Kristen V. Campana, Paying Our Own WC1y: The
Privatization of the Chilean Social Security System and Its lessons for AmericC1n
Reform, 20 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 385 (1999) (describing Chilean system). For a
description of the privatization of the Australian retirement system see infra notes 34248 and accompanying text.
2. See e.g., Jake Thompson, Congress Awaits Push on SociCll Security, OMAHA
WORLD-HERALD, Jan. 11, 2001, at 18 (discussing Social Security as the third rail of
politics); Edwin Feulner, Editorial, let's Not Forget Election's Bright Spots, CHI. SUNTJMES, Dec. 2, 2000, at 26, available at 2000 WL 6707259 (discussing how the Social
Security privatization issue was addressed in last presidential campaign). See generally
Joe Frolik, Bush Rides the "Third Rail," PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland, Ohio), June 25,
2000, at 50 (describing controversy raised in 1964 presidential campaign when Burry
Goldwater suggested that Social Security should be made voluntary). In January 1997, a
Federal Advisory Council divided over the issue whether to allow private social security
accounts, but seven of its thirteen members wanted to require compulsory saving through
individual accounts. I REPORT OF THE 1994-1996 ADVISORY COUNCIL ON SOCIAL
SECURITY, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 35-57 (Jan. 1997). A later federal
advisory committee unanimously recommended the use of private accounts to
supplement Social Security. Richard W. Stevenson, BipC1rtisan Plan for Rescue of
Social Security Involves Markets and Retirement at 70, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 1998, at
A 17. Following his election, President George W. Bush appointed a bipartisan panel to
make recommendations on how to privatize Social Security. Jackie Calmes, Bush SociC1l
Security Panel Doesn't Fear Painful Solutions, WALL ST. J., May 10, 2001, at A20.
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of additional onerous funding. 3 Resistance to privatization largely
centers on concerns that existing participants will lose their contributions
and that private accounts may result in investment losses, which would
leave future pensioners penniless. The disability and survivor benefits
of the present Social Security system also raise concerns for the plight of
the disadvantaged, should those features of Social Security be eliminated.
However, proponents of private accounts argue that such accounts would
provide far more social security and retirement benefits than available
under the present government system, which offers little more than a
poverty line existence to individuals dependent on Social Security for
retirement. Contributions to private social security accounts would also
make more funds available for investment and thereby strengthen the
economy for the benefit of everyone. Proponents further contend that
the system can be privatized without undue hardship and that survivor
and disability benefits can be privately insured more effectively than
through existing governmental programs.
This Article will address the debate and discuss regulatory concerns
that would arise with the creation of private social security accounts. As
will be shown, the present system fails to provide real social security,
and deprives those most in need of a retirement program of an
opportunity to increase their wealth or to have a comfortable retirement.
Shifting to a private system would be expensive, but could be accomplished
through recognition of the benefits of private investments and through a
program of tax credits and deductions. Existing regulatory requirements
protect private social security account holders from fraud, as well as
overreaching and unsuitable investments. The question remains whether
the government should be the custodian and provider of investment
choices in a "privatized" Social Security system. As explained in this
Article, government control would ignite a never-ending war over the
role of the government in selecting "socially responsible" investments.

II. SOCIAL SECURITY-BACKGROUND AND GROWTH
As most people are aware, the existing Social Security system is a
product of the New Deal legislation that spun out of the Great
Depression. Less remembered are the political motivations that were its
3. See generally Ron F. Docksai, Editorial, Social Security's Promise and
Reality, PITISBURGH PoST-GAZETIE, Jan. 18, 1999, at Al5, amilable 111 1999 WL
5252280 (discussing advantages of a privatized Social Security system}.
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genesis. The widespread hardship engendered by the Depression gave
rise to a renewed populist movement, which was exploited by various
socialists, demagogues, and even a "radio priest.',4 They were promoting
various programs that promised wealth to everyone. 5 Upton Sinclair
was among the leaders of this quest for a socialist utopia. He ran for
governor of California in 1934 on a platform that he called the End
Poverty in California Plan (EPIC). Sinclair proposed to tax corporations to
feed the poor, and envisioned the conversion of bankrupt factories and
farms into cooperatives. 6 According to Sinclair, within two years
cooperatives would hire the 700,000 workers then unemployed in
California. 7 EPIC further planned to give $50 per month to Californians
over age sixty. 8 Although he lost the gubernatorial race, Sinclair's EPIC
4. The Radio Priest was Father Charles E. Coughlin. VINCENT CURCIO,
CHRYSLER: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF AN AUTOMOTIVE GENIUS 577 (2000). Supported
heavily by organized labor, he was an advocate of free silver as a means of inflating the
economy. J. Y. Smith, The Reverend Charles E. Co11ghlin Dies: Noted as the 'Radio
Priest,' WASH. POST, Oct. 28, 1979, at ClO. At the time he was promoting the
widespread use of silver, the good Father and his staff were also secretly speculating on
its price through futures contracts. B. H. McCormack, Decade Saw Advent of SEC,
Revamping of Stock Exchange, WALL ST. J., Jan. 2, 1940, at 16.
5. Populism in America had been fueled in the last quarter of the nineteenth
century by the debate over the use of silver and greenbacks to improve farm conditions.
The Greenback party, which was formed in 1874, sought a system of paper currency to
relieve the plight of the farmers who were suffering from low commodity prices and high
debts. DAVIS RICH DEWEY, FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 378-79 (12th ed.
1939); JACK WEATHERFORD, THE HISTORY OF MONEY 173 (1997). William Jennings
Bryan's famous "Cross of Gold" speech was the high point of the populist movement.
See IDA M. TARBELL, THE NATIONALIZING OF BUSINESS (1878-1898) 250-51 (1936)
(describing speech and exuberant reaction by convention). Bryan lost the presidential
race, however, and the United States went onto a gold standard. See DEWEY, s11pra, at
469 (describing Gold Standard Act of 1900); MARGARET G. MYERS, A FINANCIAL
HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 218-20 (1970) (describing the Bryan campaign). The
populist movement's most memorable monument is the book The Wizard of Oz, written
by L. Frank Baum. Made into a children's movie, it was originally an allegory on the
populist fight against the gold monetary standard. WEATHERFORD, s11pra, at 175-76.
Returning prosperity at the beginning of the twentieth century doomed the populists'
cause, at least until the depression in the 1930s gave rise to its resurrection. Franklin
Roosevelt tried to harness those forces through an attack on financiers and the existing
financial system. See generally ELLIS w. HAWLEY, THE NEW DEAL AND THE PROBLEM
OF MONOPOLY 322-23 (1974) (stating that the New Deal was seeking to destroy the
"Money Power" and "High Finance"). One of Roosevelt's first acts was to take the
United States off a gold standard. WEATHERFORD, s11pra, at 181. Roosevelt then began
inflating the monetary system from his bedroom. See Francis Fukuawama, A Moral
Compass to the World, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 1998, Book Section, at 6 (describing
conflicts between Dean Acheson, then a Treasury official, and President Roosevelt over
this cavalier approach to monetary policy); DEAN ACHESON, MORNING AND NOON 16694 (1965).
6. See GREG MITCHELL, THE CAMPAIGN OF THE CENTURY: UPTON SINCLAIR'S
RACE FOR GOVERNOR OF CALIFORNIA AND THE BIRTH OF MEDIA POLITICS I03-09 ( 1992).
7. James N. Gregory, Upton Sinclair, 30 CAL. J. 45, 45 (1999).
8. Carol Vinzant, Born to Retire, FORTUNE, Aug. 16, 1999, at 81-86.
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helped push Franklin Roosevelt toward the adoption of Social Security.9
Dr. Francis Townsend was another rising populist with a plan for
relieving the hardship of the aged. His Old Age Revolving Pensions,
Ltd. program sought to have $200 paid monthly to all of the elderly,
provided they were not working and agreed to spend the money when
they received it. 10 The "Townsend Plan," as it was generally referred to,
sought to fund these payouts through a two percent transactions tax. 11
Over 7000 Townsend clubs with 2.2 million members were formed to
support this f:rogram, 12 and Townsend received some SI million in
contributions. 3
That initiative pushed Roosevelt further toward a federal retirement
program of his own, but the greatest threat to his administration was a
program promoted by "Kingfish" Huey Long, the demagogue, former
governor and senator from Louisiana. The first scientific political poll
ever undertaken indicated that a Long challenge to Roosevelt would
have resulted in the election of Alf Landon. 14 Senator Long was
promoting his "Share the Wealth" program, which would have made
"every man a king." Long wanted the government to give pensions of
$30 per month to those over age sixty who did not have an income of
$1000 per year or $10,000 in assets. 15 He wanted each family in
9.

Richard Rothstein, Friends of Bill?: Why liberals Should Let Up

011

Clinton,

AM. PROSPECT, Winter 1995, at 32 (while Sinclair was running for go\'emor he headed a

movement called End Poverty in California (EPIC), which was later characterized as the
"high tide of radicalism" in America); Pat Morrison, \Vhen Public Office WtJS t1 Lesson
in the Chemistry of Change, L.A. TIMES MAG., Nov. 14, 1999. at 16. Another
government funded retirement scheme was proposed by two Hollywood ad\'enising
men. Their "Ham and Eggs" plan would have gi\'en $30 each Thursday to old people.
Jack Smith, United They Fell, L.A. TIMES l\.1AG., Dec. 17, 1989, at 10.
10. Vinzant, supra note 8, at 81-86.
11. Alvin Williams, Refom1i11g Our Ailing Social Security System: The Suue of the
Current System and Its Impact 011 Africw1-America11s, 8 ELDER W. 221. 223-24 (2000).
12. David C. Beeder, Midlands Doctor Assisted i11 Social Sccurit~··s Birth. OMAHA
WoRLD-HERALD,Feb.8, 1998,at3B.
13. Smith, supra note 9, at 10.
14. Beeder, supra note 12, at 3B.
15. Huey Long, 'Every Mwi a King' According to the Plan o/Gotl, MINNEAPOLIS
STAR TRIB., June 12, 2000, at 11.A, amilable at http://proques1.umi.comfpqdwcb?TS=..
=l&Did= 000000055116531&Mtd=l&Fmt=3 (last visited Apr. 26, 2001!. More
recently, in 1998, Senators J. Robert Kerry and Daniel Moynihan introduced legislation
that would have provided every child in America with S 1000 at birth and an additional
$500 for each child's first five birthdays to be invested over his life. This proposal was
not adopted. Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Building \Veallhfor Ewyone, N.Y. TIMES, May
30, 2000, at A23. Another scheme proposed by Senator George McGo\'em during the
1972 presidential campaign (the "Demogrant") would have gi\'en SIOOO annually to
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America guaranteed a mimmum annual income of $2000, and his
program would have given each family $5000 to buy themselves a
home, an automobile, and a radio. Money to fund this plan would come
from confiscating the estates of the rich. 16 Long particularly targeted
John Rockefeller for such a seizure. 17
These plans were all a bit hare brained, but did place political pressure
on Franklin Roosevelt to do something. After all, these populist programs
were attacking his political base. 18 The Roosevelt administration
developed an alternative program, designed to remove the focus from
the populist, albeit impractical, programs fast gaining support among the
masses that were so severely affected by the Depression. The Roosevelt
program was enacted into law in 1935. 19 The "Social Security"
legislation was crafted by Marion Folsom, the Treasurer for Eastman
Kodak Company.20 It created a federal pension system funded by taxes
on employers and employees. 21
The Social Security program as originally enacted did not seek to
provide universal coverage for retirement benefits. In fact, it was quite
limited in scope. Indeed, benefits were restricted to such an extent that a
skeptic might think it was merely a rather cynical political plan designed
to divert attention from the more radical proposals of the populists on the
far left of the Roosevelt constituency.
Most workers were simply excluded from the Social Security Act.
America's largest business was agriculture, yet farm laborers, who had
no company pension plans, did not qualify for benefits. 22 Also excluded
were the self-employed, educators, household servants, casual laborers
and the masses of unemployed. 23 This left for coverage the industrial

every man, woman and child in the United States. Charles Krauthammer, Family Lmve
Flimflam, WASH. POST, Sept. 18, 1992, at A2 l.
l 6. Thomas DiBacco, Long Line of the Kingfish, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 30, 1993, at
E4.
17. DAVID M. KENNEDY, FREEDOM FROM FEAR: THE AMERICAN PEOPLE IN
DEPRESSION AND WAR, l 929-1945, at 238 ( 1999).
18. By 1934, twenty-eight states had adopted some form of old-age pension laws,
but funding and benefits were inadequate. Vinzant, supra note 8, at 83.
19. Social Security Act, Pub. L. No. 74-271, 49 Stat. 620 (1935). See generally
ALEX GRONER, AMERICAN BUSINESS & INDUSTRY 299 (Alvin M. Josephy, Jr. ed., 1972)
(describing Social Security).
20. David Brody, Modem Manors: Welfare Capitalism Since the New Deal, 52
INDUS. & LAB. REL REV. 325 ( 1999) (book review).
21. PETER FEARON, WAR, PROSPERITY, AND DEPRESSION: THE U.S. ECONOMY
(1917-1945) 244--45 (1987).
22. Agriculture continues to be America's largest business. Benjamin Schwan,
Broken Heartland, The Rise of America's Rural Ghetto, 263 NATION, No. 14, at 27
(1996) (book review), available at LEXIS, AIINewsPlus.
23. Social Security Act, Pub. L. No. 74-271, § 210, 49 Stat. 620, 625 (1935);
FEARON, supra note 21, at 244.
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workers who were organized and could pose a political threat to the New
Deal. Ironically, among the laboring classes, industrial workers needed
Social Security the least.
Although their lives were hard and
unemployment threatened every day, the industrial workers eligible for
Social Security were receiving paychecks that gave them regular sources
of income-an advantage denied to many of those excluded from the
system. At the same time, industrial workers were already witnessing
the development of company pension plans, something unavailable to
other classes of workers.24 Those circumstances suggest that the Roosevelt
administration threw this sop to the industrial workers because of the
political threat posed by organized labor.
Even more cynically, eligibility for Social Security retirement benefits
did not begin until age sixty-five.25 At the time of the enactment of this
legislation, the life expectancy of Americans was sixty-two.:?6 Thus, it
did not appear that the system really intended to protect anyone, except a
very limited class of workers who might exceed their life expectancy, a
presumably small group.27
The doctrine of unintended consequences soon intervened to expand
Social Security far beyond its original goals. The first Social Security
check was mailed in 1940 to Ida May Fuller in Ludlow, Vermont, just as
the Depression was ending. Ida May Fuller did not die until 1975, at the
age of 100.28 This type of longevity was unforeseen in the midst of the
hardships engendered by the Depression. But postwar prosperity and
medical advances resulted in a substantial extension of life expectancy,
which raised concerns that increased numbers of elderly retired workers
would face poverty unless the Social Security system was expanded.
Having experienced the ravages of the Great Depression, the American
public wanted a safety net for the years in which they would no longer
be able to work. As a consequence, Social Security was expanded to
reach over nine million people in the 1950s.2Q Eventually, the Social
24. See discussion infra notes 62-79 and accompanying text.
25. Social Security Act, Pub. L. No. 74-271, § 210, 49 Stat. 620,625 I 19351.
26. Mary Deibel, Social Security \Viii Be Major Bauleground. Presidentit1l
Candidates Have Different Ideas 011 Sa\'ing the Program, DETROIT NEWS, Aug. 20. 2000.
at 18.
27. In fairness, congressional hearings on the Social Security Acl found thac the
number of persons over age sixty-five were increasing and 1ha1 many in 1ha1 age group
were in desperate circumstances. Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619,642 (1937).
28. Fuller made $24.75 in Social Security contribu1ions and received S22.889 in
benefits. Vinzant, supra note 8, at 83.
29. HAROLD G. VATIER, THE U.S. ECONOMY IN lHE 1950s: AN Ecoso~uc
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Security system became mandatory for almost all workers. 30
Today, over 147 million Americans and their employers are paying
Social Security taxes.31 Coverage has also broadened to include dependents
of workers and disabled employees. 32 As a result of expanded coverage,
more than forty-four million individuals were receiving Social Security
benefits in the year 2000. 33
The Social Security system demonstrated several weaknesses beyond
simply the scope of coverage. Benefits could be lost if the benefici~
earned more than specified amounts before reaching age seventy-two: 4
This provided a disincentive for elderly people to remain in the work
force, and those restrictions were eased. Nevertheless, benefits are still
lost today as the result of continued employment, until an individual
reaches full retirement age, which is being increased to age sixtyseven. 35
Social Security benefits were increased for the first time in 1950. 36
That increase reflected an inherent weakness in the Social Security
system. Benefits were to be paid to workers in defined amounts that
were based on several factors, including their contributions to the system
and age of retirement. That computation did not take into account the
effect of inflation, which could quickly undermine the value of a fixed
benefit.
As long as the economy was stable, the defined benefits available
from Social Security, though they were small, could be used to maintain
a stable retirement program. The elderly did not necessarily escape
poverty, but they could subsist. Inflation was moderate after the Korean
conflict, but unfortunately that happy circumstance changed in the
1960s. The Vietnam War pushed inflation to new heights. Retirees
dependent on defined benefits that were set at preinflation levels were
devastated. Congress responded by increasing benefits by 20% in 1972,
HISTORY 198 (1963).
30. This would cause embarrassment for some political appointees who failed to
withhold Social Security and other taxes on their baby sitters and domestic help. Zoe
Baird was one victim of this requirement. Her appointment as Attorney General in 1993
was withdrawn after it was revealed that she had employed illegal immigrants as
domestic help and failed to pay Social Security taxes for them. More recently, the
appointment of Linda Chavez as Secretary of Labor was withdrawn on similar grounds.
First Blood, ECONOMIST, Jan. 13, 2001, at 27; William Bradford Reynolds, Etiqttettefor
the Senate, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2001, at A23.
31. Robert Rosenblatt, A Radical Idea Becomes a Savior of the Elderly, L.A.
TIMES, Oct. 16, 1999, at B4.
32. Id.
33. Soc. SEC. ADMIN., SOCIAL SECURITY: BASIC FACTS I (2000).
34. Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 608-09 (1960).
35. Soc. SEC. ADMIN., SOCIAL SECURITY: UNDERSTANDING THE BENEFITS 29
(2000).
36. Vinzant, supra note 8, at 85.
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and then providing for automatic cost of living adjustments thereafter. 37
Lyndon Johnson's Great Society programs extended the safety net
further by expanding welfare programs and benefits for the elderly. By
the end of the century, the American government would be expending
more than $400 billion per year for Social Security and related programs
such as Medicare.38 The growth of such entitlement programs periodically
raised funding concerns. Inflation rose by 60% between 1977 and 1981,
while wages fell almost 7%. At the same time, inflation-adjusted Social
Security benefits were increasing and placing strains on the ability of
workers to fund those benefits. 39 This resulted in increased withholdings
and restrictions on access.40 The eligibility age for benefits was also
increased for younger participants, and benefits began to be taxed in
1983.41 Originally, contributions were limited to 3% for the employee
and employer on income up to $3000.42 Contributions have since been
increased to meet funding requirements, and by 2000 a worker and his or
her employer were each required to contribute 6.2 % (a total of 12.4%)
of the first $76,200 earned by the employee.43
Increasing contributions and restricting access to benefits belied
44
another problem. As even the government now concedes, benefits
under Social Security are too meager to allow a comfortable retirement
without outside sources of income. It also appears that in order to
continue the system, benefits will have to be maintained at a poverty
level with increasingly higher years of eligibility and forfeitures for
those with other sources of income. As a result, the Social Security
system is looking more like a welfare system than like the retirement
savings plan that was originally promoted and maintained over the
years.45
37. Id.
38. KENNEDY, supra note 17, at 273.
39. JUSTIN MARTIN, GREENSPAN: TlIBl\fAN BEHINDTI-lEMONEY 146 (2000).
40. The Social Security system was changed from a pay-as-you-go to a partially
funded system in 1977. Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Building \llealrhfor Everyone. N.Y.
TIMES, May 30, 2000, at A23.
41. Vinzant, supra note 8, at 86. That action was taken by Congress following a
report by a Social Security Commission that was headed by Alan Greenspan. MARTIN.
supra note 39, at 147.
42. Amity Shlaes, Fixing Social Security, 107 COMMENT. 38 (1999).
43. Soc. SEC. ADMIN., supra note 35, at 8.
44. See infra note 50 and accompanying texL
45. The bureaucracy needed to administer Social Security benefits is also massive
and imposes costs that effectively tax everyone. That budget has grown rapic.lly. In
fiscal year 1990, the Social Security Administration's budget was about S4.2 billion.
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The system is also bankrupt, at least for those expecting future
benefits. Recent legislation required the Social Security Administration
to begin providing participants with an annual disclosure of their
contributions and expected benefits. Those statements reveal just how
ineffective Social Security is as a retirement program. Specifically, the
agency was advising participants through those statements that the
system will be paying out more in benefits than will be collected in taxes
by the year 2015. By the year 2034, Social Security "trust funds will be
exhausted and the payroll taxes collected will be able to pay only 71 % of
benefits owed." 46
That hardly sounds like social security. Indeed, it seems to fit closely
with the definition of bankruptcy. More troubling is the fact that
younger workers will be required to fund benefits for greater number of
retirees even while their own numbers are shrinking. Today, there are
about 3.25 workers for each retiree. By the year 2030, that ratio will
drop to two-to-one. 47 Future workers will have to give up increasing
amounts of their income to keep the Social Security system solvent,
crippling their own efforts to avoid poverty and save for retirement. 48
Robert Pear, Social Security is Short of Money, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 1990, at A22. The
Social Security Administrator was seeking $7.3 billion in funds for his agency's
administrative budget in fiscal year 2001. Prepared Testimony of Steve Korn Before the
House Committee on Ways and Means Subcommittee on Social Security, FED. NEWS
SERV., Mar. 16, 2000, available at LEXIS, News Group File, All. Another problem is
fraud. Some 25,000 fugitives from justice were receiving supplemental disability
income (which is paid from general tax revenues) from the Social Security
Administration between 1996 and 2000 in amounts totaling as much as $283 million.
Check's in the Mail, Even if You're a Fugitive, NEWS-ENTERPRISE (Elizabethtown, KY),
Dec. 27, 2000, at 6A. But see HENRY J. AARON & ROBERTO. REISCHAUER, COUNTDOWN
TO REFORM: THE GREAT SOCIAL SECURITY DEBATE 86-88 (1998) (contending that
collective administrative costs of small, IRA-type privatized accounts would exceed
present government expenditures).
46. Letter from the Social Security Administration, to Jerry W. Markham,
Professor of Law, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill I (May 9, 2000) (on file
with author). More recent projections have pushed the date of the exhaustion of Social
Security reserves to 2038. Jackie Calmes, Bush Social Security Panel Doesn't Fear
Painful Solutions, WALL ST. J., May 10, 2001 at A20; Peter Spiegel, U.S. and Canada:
Health Refonn Next 011 Agenda, FINANCIAL TIMES (London), Mar. 20, 2001, at 13,
available at LEXIS, News Group File, All. For countervailing views on Social Security
bankruptcy, compare SYLVESTER J. SCHIEBER & JOHN B. SHOVEN, THE REAL DEAL: THE
HISTORY AND FUTURE OF SOCIAL SECURITY ( 1999), describing concerns with Social
Security, with DEAN BAKER & MARK WEISBROT, SOCIAL SECURITY: THE PHONY CRISIS
( 1999), contending that concerns with Social Security are overblown.
47. MARTIN, supra note 39, at 147. At the time Social Security was adopted there
were twenty-five workers for each retiree. Donald 8. Marron, Not Privatizing Social
Security Is the Biggest Risk of All, WALL ST. J., May 18, 2000, at A26.
48. This flaw in the mostly pay-as-you-go financing of the Social Security System
has led to its criticism of being a "giant Ponzi scheme." JOHN ALOYSIUS FARRELL, TIP
O'NEILL AND THE DEMOCRATIC CENTURY 570-71 (2001) (describing criticism of Social
Security by David Stockman, a Reagan administration official). Another critic called
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Already, about 80% of American households "pay more in Social
Security than in income taxes.',49
The level of Social Security benefits raises additional concerns.
Benefits do little more than place recipients at about the poverty level.
In statements mailed to American workers, the Commissioner of Social
Security noted that his program's benefits were the largest source of
income for most elderly Americans, but he cautioned that: "Social
Security benefits were not intended to be the only source of income for
you and your family when you retire. You'll need to supplement your
benefits from a pension, savings or investments."50
Certainly, the level of Social Security benefits does not reflect a
reward for a lifetime of hard work and saving. The benefits, as will be
discussed below, do not provide any meaningful return on the investment of
the contributions made by the employee and their employer.
More importantly, these limited benefits fall most heavily on the poor.
The more wealthy have alternate retirement plans and to them, as the
Commissioner suggests, Social Security is only a supplement to
retirement benefits. Wealthier individuals are able to invest their
retirement savings in investments that pay market returns and increase
their wealth considerably through tax-free compounding during their
working years. In contrast, the people most in need of an effective
retirement program are those with the lowest income levels. They have
little or no discretionary income for private retirement programs. Social
Security is their only retirement plan, and it offers little return on their
investments.51 The amount of employee and employer contributions is
Social Security a "pyramid scheme." Calmes, supra note 46, at A20.
49. Moynihan, supra note 40, at A23. See ge11erally John D. McKinnon, Busl,
Co,mnission Begi11s to Make Case That Social Security Must Be O1'erhault:d, \VALL ST.
J., July 20, 2001, at A12 (describing sharp increases in payroll ta,ccs or r.:ductions in
benefits that will be needed to fund Social Security if it is not privatized).
50. Letter from the Social Security Administration, supra note 46, at I.
51. As one critic has noted:
In terms of rate of return on taxes "invested," Social Security is a bum deal and
getting worse. It is particularly bad for dual-income families, who pay the tax
twice and pretty much collect benefits once. Also for blacks, who have shoner
life expectancies and will receive fewer benefits. According to Heritage
Foundation calculations, the inflation-adjusted return for a young working
couple with children is 1.23%. Single low-income blacks born after I959 have
negative rates of return-on average paying more in Social Security taxes than
they claim in benefits.
Robert L. Bartley, Eco110111ics 101 011 Prii-ati::bzg Social Security, WALL ST. J•• May 22.
2000, at A39. See generally Kevin A Hassett, Social Securil)' Re/om, Can ·r Wait.
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considerable over the working life of the employee: 12.4% of annual
income up to $76,200. But the benefits, if paid, will be insubstantial.
As a result, the poor are deprived of an opportunity to increase their
wealth through a savings program that will offer compounded returns
over their working lives. The working poor also will not be able to
accumulate estates through Social Security contributions that could be
passed to future generations for their education, investment, or improved
lifestyles, which would allow an escape from the cycle of poverty.
The present system has other debilitating effects. If someone wants to
continue to work after he first qualifies for Social Security, in order to
improve his living standard, he will lose Social Security benefits until he
reaches the full retirement age (which is being raised to sixty-seven). 52
Indeed, it seems as if the system were specifically designed to punish the
working poor by denying them any opportunity to accumulate wealth.
That was not the goal of Social Security, but it is the effect. 53 If lowerincome workers were able to direct their Social Security contributions
and those of their employer to a private retirement account, like those
available to the wealthy for discretionary income, they could accumulate
estates large enough to provide a comfortable retirement. Perhaps, they
could even leave something to their children and grandchildren that
would help them improve their lots in life.

ill. THE ROLE OF PRIVATE PENSIONS IN AMERICAN SOCIETY
Social Security was founded at a time when private pensions were in
their infancy, but such plans received widespread acceptance in
subsequent years. Today, private plans form the basis for the retirement
of many individuals. As noted previously, Social Security should be
viewed as only a supplement to such plans. 54 Therefore, the history of
private plans and their regulation forms an important backdrop for
present efforts to privatize Social Security.
The concept of a pension in the form of an annuity, a series of lifetime
WALL ST. J., July 20, 2001 at AIO (noting that low income individuals have shorter life
spans and will, therefore, receive less in Social Security benefits than the longer lived
more affluent).
52. Soc. SEC. ADMIN., supra note 35, at 29. The system also seeks to discourage
early retirement by denying full benefits until full retirement age. Id. Those persons
filing a joint return with combined income of more than $44,000 will also have up to
85% of their Social Security benefits taxed. Id. at 30.
53. Again, in fairness, Social Security has provided a lifeline for many millions
who would not have saved for retirement in the absence of a mandatory system such as
Social Security. Their income was simply too little to view retirement savings as
anything other than a luxury. It is, nonetheless, unfortunate that they do not have a more
positive return on their forced savings.
54. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
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payments, has been traced back to ancient societies in Egypt, Babylonia,
India, China, and Rome. 55 Annuities also existed in Europe as early as
the Eighth century. 56 King John was providing pensions in the fonn of
annuities in 1214 A.D. They were a precursor to government pensions
in modem society.57
In America, the federal government experimented with pension
schemes on a large scale for the first time following the conclusion of
the Civil War. 58 Pensions for disabled veterans were then being offered
freely, and with much abuse, as Congress continually expanded that
program. In 1866, there were about 127,000 Union pensioners; Confederate
veterans were not invited to apply. Between 1861 and 1887, the United
States spent over $800 million on veterans' pensions, a tremendous sum
at the time.59 This first federal experiment with a pension plan fully
evidenced the fact that such grants of government largess were
expensive, difficult to control, and under continual pressure to be
increased at the expense of the Treasury.
The first pension plan for municipal employees in America appears to
have been created by New York City in 1857, for policemen.f.11 New
55. CLYDE J. CROBAUGH, ANNuITIES AND THEIR USES 13 (1933). Soldiers in the
Roman legions had a portion of their pay withheld in order to fund their pensions that
were available after twenty years of service. Peter Bobbin, The Principles of
Supera,uzuation, in SUPERANNUATION-AN lNTRooucnoN 1-2 (Sept. 5, 1997)
(continuing legal education seminar papers, on file with author).
56. CROBAUGH, supra note 55, at 14.
57. EDWARD BURMAN, THE TEMPI.ARS: KNIGHTS OF Goo 82 (19861. The
Corporation for the Relief of Widows and Children of Clergymen in the Communion of
the Church of England in America was fonned in 1769 to provide annuities for survivors
of clergy. 1 JOSEPH STANCLIFFE DAVIS, EsSAYS IN THE EARLIER HISTORY OF A\IERICAN
CORPORATIONS 81 (Russell & Russell, Inc. 1965) ( 1917).
58. Those pensions were in response to president Lincoln's second inaugural
address in which he asked the Union "to bind up the nation's wounds, to care for him
who shall have borne the battle and for his widow and his orphan." Excerpts From
Inaugural Speeches With Challenges, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2001, at Al 6.
59. ALYN BRODSKY, GROVER CLEVELAND, A STUDY L"l CHARAC'Tl:R 181-89
(2000). Pensions were also granted to veterans of the Indian and Spanish-American
wars. In 1923, President Calvin Coolidge vetoed legislation that sought to increase
pensions for veterans of those conflicts and of the Civil War. ROBERT SOBEL. COOLIDGE:
AN AMERICAN ENIGMA 279 (1998). Members of the anned services continue to receive
pensions that allow them to retire after twenty years of service with cost-of-lhing
adjustments. Maura Dolan, Military on Defe11sfre in Pension \Var, LA. TL\tES, Apr. 20,
1985, at Al. Those individuals, however, are now being allowed to invest their funds in
private investments, the success of which will determine their benefit levels. For the
legislation authorizing military members to participate in those Thrift Savings Plans, see
5 U.S.C. § 8440e (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
60. AM. COUNCIL OF LIFE INS., 1996 LIFE INSURANCE FACT BOOK 131 ll 996 ).
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York's spending generosity would threaten to bankrupt the city on
several occasions. 61 The first fonnal private sector pension plan appeared in
1875 and was the product of the American Express Company. 62 The
B&O Railroad was offering a pension to its employees in the 1880s,
supported by both employer and employee contributions. 63 The Illinois
Central Railroad Company granted a request by employees to allow
them to purchase the company's stock. 64 Railroads were a particularly
rich source for pension plan growth. By 1905, twelve railroads had
pension plans that covered 35% of railroad workers. 65
The Procter & Gamble Company created a profit sharing plan for
employees in 1886. 66 The development of other large corporations
61. See VINCENT P. CAROSSO, INVESTMENT BANKING IN AMERICA: A HISTORY
197-98 (1970) (telling how J.P. Morgan & Co. led emergency refunding of City notes at
the outbreak of World War I); JEAN STROUSE, MORGAN: AMERICAN FINANCIER 581-83
(1999) (describing J.P. Morgan's rescue of New York City during the Panic of 1907);
Ellmore Patterson, Ellmore Patterson, in THE WAY IT WAS: AN ORAL HISTORY OF
FINANCE: 1967-1987, 521, 524 (Eds. of Institutional Investor eds., 1988) (telling how
J.P. Morgan & Co. supplied $50 million to rescue the City in the 1930's). By 1951, the
budget of New York City was second only to that of the federal government, and the
City's financial problems were growing as well. George E. Cruikshank, New York's
Furious Fiscal Problems Typify Many a Town's Troubles, WALL ST. J., Dec. 1, 1951, at
I. The most spectacular of the City's periodic crises occurred in 1974-1975 when the
City found that it had outspent its revenues and credit resources. A gigantic rescue effort
was launched that included the creation of the Municipal Assistance Corporation ("Big
Mac") and a contribution of $150 million from the New York City teachers' pension
fund. GERALD R. FORD, A TIME TO HEAL: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF GERALD R. FORD
319 (1979); Felix Rohatyn, Felix Rohatyn, in THE WAY IT WAS, supra, at 175; Robert D.
McFadden, Abraham Beame is Dead at 94; Mayor During 70's Fiscal Crisis, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 11, 2001, at Al. Lest we be too hard on New York, it should be
remembered that during a budget crisis in 1995, the Treasury Department used pension
funds of federal employees to avoid a default on federal government debt payments.
Adam Clymer, Treasury Takes Retirement Funds to Avert Default, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16,
1995, at Al.
62. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, SURVEY OF CORPORATE PENSION FUNDS 1951-1954, at
I (1956).
63. AM. COUNCIL OF LIFE INS., supra note 60, al 131.
64. NAT'L INDUS. CONFERENCE Bo., INC., EMPLOYEE STOCK PURCHASE PLANS IN
THE UNITED STATES I (1928). The Firestone Tire & Rubber Company also allowed
employees to purchase the company's stock. The Pittsburgh Coal Company and the First
National Bank of Chicago allowed employees to purchase company stock on an
installment basis. Id.
65. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, supra note 62, at I.
66. Id. Profit sharing was not a new concept. It was used by Albert Gallatin at his
Pennsylvania Glass Works in 1795. STROUSE, supra note 61, at 428. Several other
corporations had profit sharing plans at the beginning of the twentieth century, including
the Illinois Central Railroad, the New York Life Insurance Company, the National
Biscuit Company, the Pittsburgh Coal Company, the Carnegie Steel Company, and
United States Steel. Id.; AM. COUNCIL OF LIFE INS., supra note 60, at 131. Another early
retirement plan was created by the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey. SEC. & EXCH.
COMM'N, supra note 62, at I. Some ninety companies had employee stock purchase
plans by the conclusion of World War I. ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE
MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 58 (rev. ed. 1968).
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expanded the popularity of pension and profit sharing plans and other
employee benefits.67 The Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association
was created in 1918 by the Carnegie Foundation to supply retirement
programs for teachers. It later created the College Retirement Equity
Fund (CREF) to allow retirement plans that invested in equities.63
Congress began a pension program for federal civil service employees in
1920.69 The Revenue Act of 1921 exempted employer contributions to
private profit sharing plans from the income tax. 70
By 1925, about four million employees were covered by 400 private
pension plans.71 In 1928, 64% of companies in America had some form
of bonus and profit sharing plan,72 which often provided for
contributions to be deducted from employee paychecks. n General
Motors created a package of workers' benefits, and Chrysler adopted a
similar program in July 1929. The Chrysler benefits package included
life, health, and disability insurance, and a stock purchase program for
supervisors. A savings and investment program for Chrysler employees
matched up to 50% of their contributions. Those savings were invested
67. International Harvester Co. created a pension plan in 1908 that offered an
average benefit in 1919 of $32 per month for employees with twenty or more years of
service. HERMAN E. KRooss & l\1ARnN R. BLYN, A HISTORY OF FL"lANCJAL
IN1ERMEDIARIES 166 (1971). American Telephone and Telegraph began a pension plan
in 1913; Sears, Roebuck in 1916; and U.S. Rubber Co. in 1917. ALE.x GRO:-.ER,
AMERICAN BUSINESS & INDUS'IRY 217 (1972); PAUL P. HARBRECHT, PENSION FUNDS AND
EcONOr.nc POWER 85 (1959); SEC. & ExCH. COMM'N, supra note 62, at I. By 1923. over
120 companies were offering pension plans to their employees. BERLE & MEANS, supra
note 66, at 58. Those plans held over $90 million in assets. Following World War I.
deferred annuities were sometimes purchased from insurance companies as a pension for
employees. KRooss & BLYN, supra, at 166.
68. ROBERT SOBEL, INSIDE \VAll STREET: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE L"l THE
FINANCIAL DISTRICT 226 (1977).
69. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, supra note 62, at I. The civil service pension scheme
for federal employees was threatening the Treasury in the 1980s and was rcfonncd. For
those employed after the adoption of this legislation, a system was implemented similar
to modem private sector pensions with matching employer contributions and
participation in Social Security. Stephen Barr, Reriri11g \Virh Protecrio11. at 55 or
Earlier, \VASH. POST, May 8, 2000, at A21. Under this system, the employee contribut~
the same 6.2% to Social Security as do private employees, except there ii. no matching
employer contribution. Stephen Barr, U11de Sam Gers /1110 the Goodie-Gfri11g Spirit of
the Seaso11, WASH. POST, Oct 31, 2000, at B2. For a funher description of thii, program
see i11fra notes 318-19 and accompanying text
70. AM. COUNCII. OF LIFE INS., supra note 60, at 132.
71. HARBRECHT, supra note 67, at 6.
72. John Balkcom & Roger Brossy, Execlllil-e Pay-The11, Now. tmd Ahem/, 22
DIRECTORS & BOARDS 55, 57 (1997), a\'Oi/able at LEXIS IAC-ACC-NO: 20219928.
73. NAT'L INDUS. CONFERENCE Bo., INC., supra note 64, at 15.
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in stock, and the program was immediatelr popular, gaining more than
$200,000 in contributions within a year. 4 Unfortunately, the stock
market crashed in October 1929 and reduced the value of that benefit.
Some employers were more generous than others during the Great
Depression that followed the market crash. 75 General Electric provided
employee insurance, mortgage assistance, pensions, bonuses, profit
sharing, and other benefits. 76 The fact remained, however, that very few
of the elderly were actually provided any benefits from pension plans,
even those of state govemments. 77 Less than 15% of employees were
covered by a retirement plan in the 1930s.78 Moreover, even companies
offering pension plans did so on a voluntary and restricted basis.
Generally, employers required several years of uninterrupted service before
a pension was awarded. Employers were not required to make plans
available or to pay any particular level of benefits, and employees had
no vested rights in their pensions. 79
The number of private pension plans began to increase rapidly after
1937.80 By 1950, 25% of workers in the private sector were covered by
some form of annuity or pension. 81 Pension fund investments totaled
about $1 billion in 1940,82 a number that increased to between $5 and $8
billion in 1950. 83 The number of employees covered by private pension
plans increased even further from 5.6 million to 12.5 million between
1945 and 1954. 84 By the latter date, pension fund reserves had increased
to an estimated $20 to $25 billion. 85 About fourteen million workers
were covered by private investment plans by the end of the 1950s.86
74. VINCENT CURCIO, CHRYSLER: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF AN AUTOMOTIVE GENIUS
569 (2000).
75. The severity of the Great Depression is hard to imagine. Unemployment
increased from 3.2% in 1929 to almost 25% in 1933. Wages were cut in half and total
national income dropped by more than 50%. PETER FEARON, WAR, PROSPERITY AND
DEPRESSION: THE U.S. ECONOMY 1917--45, at 137 (1987); WILLIAM K. KLINGAMAN,
1929: THE YEAR OF THE GREAT CRASH 337-38 ( 1989).
76. THOMAS F. O'BOYLE, AT ANY COST: JACK WELCH, GENERAL ELECTRIC, AND
THE PURSUIT OF PROAT 56 (1998).
77. KENNEDY, supra note 17, at 260.
78. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, supra note 62, at I.
19. See generally McNevin v. Solvay Process Co., 53 N.Y.S. 98 (1898)
(describing limitations of an employee's pension rights in a case where defendant
company's pension fund was by its own "voluntary" design and action).
80. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, supra note 62, at I.
81. Liz Pulliam, Employee Benefits: Hard-Won and Ever-Changing Package, L.A.
TIMES, Nov. 21, 1999, at TIO; Vinzant, supra note 8, at 85.
82. KRooss & BLYN, supra note 67, at 209.
83. Id.; SOBEL, supra note 68, at 225.
84. s. REP. No. 84-1734, at 2 (1956).
85. Id. Some 90% of workers were participants in public or private retirement
plans by 1956. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, supra note 62, at I.
86. Jack Hanicke, Pension Fund's Stock Sways Engineer Though He Owns None
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Corporate income taxes during World War II encouraged private
pension fund growth, making pension benefits a useful form of
compensation for employees.87 The Railroad Retirement Act for
railroad pensioners expanded the reach of retirement plans.~ The
growth of unions after the war furthered pension growth. John L. Lewis,
the head of the United Mine Workers, sought pension rights for his
union members in 1945. The miners struck and threatened to shut down
a significant portion of American commerce. Although the mines were
seized by President Harry Truman, an agreement was reached that
11
created an employer financed pension fund for the mine workers.s This
spurred other unions to seek similar benefits through collective bargaining.
The courts gave impetus to those efforts in 1949 by holding that pension
funds could be the subject of mandatory collective bargaining.'1°
In 1950, the General Motors pension plan was funded by the company
through the "then-radical idea of investing pension money in the stock
market."91 To reduce risk, the fund was to put no more than 5% of its
assets in any single company's stock, and General Motors agreed not to
purchase its own stock for the pension plan.92 The General Motors
pension plan became a model for other large companies.93 The market
run-up in the 1950s underscored the importance of such investments and
encouraged the use of such plans.94 Congress further aided the growth of
private pension plans in 1954 by allowing tax deductions for contributions
to qualified pension plans.95
Most retirement plans were defined benefit plans before World War

Directly, WALL ST. J., Aug. 3, 1959, at 1.
87. MARGAREr G. MYERS, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 396
(1970); SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, supra note 62, at 2.
88. SEC. & ExcH. COMM'N, supra note 62, at 1.
89. E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498,505 (1998).
90. HARBRECIIT, supra note 67, at 39-40 (1959); SEC. & E.XCH. Cm.tM'N, supra
note 62, at 2; see also Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB, 170 F.2d 247, 251 l7th Cir. 1948)
(holding that pension benefits were subject to mandatory collective bargaining).
91. Wlll.IAM M. O'BARR & JOHN M. CONLEY, FORTUNE AND FOLLY: THE WEALTH
AND POWER OF INSTITIJTIONAL INvESTING 18 ( 1992).
92 Id. at 18-19.
93. SOBEL, supra note 68, at 226.
94. The stock market increased almost continuously between September 1953 and
January 1955. S. REP. No. 84-1280, at 1 (1955). Stock market prices jumped 43~ in
1958. MARTIN s. FRIDSON, IT WAS A VERY Gooo YEAR: E:\."lRAOROINARY MOME!\'1'S IN
STOCKMARKETHlsTORY vii (1998).
95. Pub.L.No.591,68AStat 15(1954).
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II. 96 Employees received a set benefit based on the number of years with
the firm and the amount of the employee's pay while working. Defined
contribution plans, which required the employees to contribute to their
pension plan, became popular after the war. The employer and employee
contributions were then used to purchase stocks, bonds, and other
investments. The amount of the employee's pension benefits depended
on the market performance of those assets, as well as the amount
invested. 97
A large number of pension plans in the 1950s were self-funded plans
kept and invested by a trustee. The Federal Reserve Board authorized
commercial banks in 1955 to create collective investment funds for
corporate retirement plans. 98 This allowed banks to pool the assets of
small employee benefit plans into common trust funds, which could then
be managed collectively. 99 General Mills started a trend, placing
management of pension funds into the hands of professional money
managers which were not banks. 100 Some pension funds were managed
by insurance companies. Under those schemes, individual pension plan
investments were commingled with other investments of the insurance
companies. 101 As will be discussed below, insurance companies also
play a large role in retirement through their annuity products. 102
The principal investments for pension funds before World War II were
corporate bonds. 103 The rise in the stock market in the 1950s, however,
led to much interest in common stock on the part of the pension funds. 104
Restrictions on trustee investments, which were applied to the collective
management of pension funds, often precluded investments in common
stocks. 105 California, however, allowed its public retirement systems to
buy common stocks, and New York authorized corporate pension funds
in 1950 to invest up to 30% of their holdings in common stocks. By
96. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, DIV. OF INVESTMENT MGMT., PROTECTING INVESTORS:
A HALF CENTURY OF INVESTMENT COMPANY REGULATION 125 (l 992).
91. Id. at xxi; KENNETH J. THYGERSON, FINANCIAL MARKETS AND INSTITUTIONS: A
MANAGERIAL APPROACH 295-96 ( 1993).
98. 2 JANE W. D' ARISTA, THE EVOLUTION OF U.S. FINANCE: RESTRUCTURING
INSTITUTIONS AND MARKETS 309 (1994).
99. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, DIV. OF INVESTMENT MGMT., supra note 96, at 12526; see also Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 307-08
(discussing value added by the ability to manage trust funds collectively).
l 00. Robert Kirby, Robert Kirby, in THEWAY IT WAS, supra note 61, at 51, 52.
101. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, supra note 62, at 3.
I 02. See infra notes 245-52 and accompanying text.
103. "Before I 950 it was unusual for a pension fund to invest in common stocks."
HAROLD G. VATTER, THE U.S. ECONOMY IN THE 1950'S: AN ECONOMIC HISTORY 198
(1963).
104. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, supra note 62, at l l.
l 05. For a discussion of these restrictions see infra notes 255-64 and accompanying
text.
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1955, pension funds were purchasing as much as 25% of the outstanding
common and preferred shares of "blue chip" companies. 106 Private
pension plan assets were increasing at a rate in excess of $3.5 billion a
year in the early 1960s, and a large amount of those funds were being
invested in preferred and common stocks. 107 Still, bonds remained a
popular investment for the pension funds. In 1958, pension funds held
over 10% of the bonds listed on the New York Stock Exchange. 103
Serious problems occurred as a result of the growth of pension plans.
Employee rights to benefits often went unprotected. Many employees
did not have a vested interest in their pension funds and lost any rights if
their service at the company was terminated, or interrupted for any
reason. 109 Some pension plans were unfunded. This meant they were on
a pay-as-you-go basis, and emplo ees had no protection if the company
could not meet its obligations. 1111 Congress sought to curb abuses in
pension fund management through legislation that required pension
plans to make disclosures and file financial reports with the United
States Department of Labor. 111 The Employees Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) 112 provided further protections for
employees covered by defined benefit plans. 113 This legislation was
spurred by the failure of the Studebaker Corporation, which left 4000
employees with unfunded benefits. The Pension Benefits Guaranty
Corporation was created by ERISA to insure future workers from such
shortfalls. 114 BRISA imposed on plan fiduciaries "a number of detailed
duties and responsibilities, which include 'the proper management,
administration and investment of [plan] assets, the maintenance of
proper records, the disclosure of specified information, and the
106. MYERS, supra note 5, at 396.
107. HARBRECHf, supra note 67, at 3; A Jaml!S Meigs. 11,e Changing Role of Btmks in
the Market for Equities, 20 J. FIN. 368,375 (1965), al'ai/ab/e at http://www.jstor.org/
Oast visited May 29, 2001).
108. V ATIER, supra note 103, at 199.
109. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
110. VATTER, supra note 103, at 199.
111. Id.
112. 29 u.s.c. §§ 1001-1461.
113. For a description of ERISA. see Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471
U.S. 724, 732 (1985).
114. Thomas Lee, The Pension and the 40/(k), SEATn.E TIMES, Apr. 24, 2000, at
Cl, available at 2000 WL 5532516. There arc limitations on this guarantee. For
example, for plans with a 1998 termination date, the maximum annual guarantee was
about $35,000. JOHN DOWNES & JORDAN EWOT GOODMAN, FINANCE AND lNVESThlEJl.'T
HANDBOOK 498 (5th ed. 1998).
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avoidance of conflicts of interest.'" 115
More significantly, BRISA allowed individuals to create their own
individual retirement accounts (IRAs), provided their employer did not
maintain a private pension plan. Although Congress cut back the
availability of these individual accounts in the Tax Reform Act of
1986, 116 it later expanded coverage to allow individuals with employer
pension plans to have their own IRA account, and increased contribution
limits. 117 Still, restrictions were imposed that continue to hamper the use
of these accounts as an adequate retirement vehicle. Under that
legislation, before-tax contributions from adjusted gross income was
limited to $2000 per year for an individual or $4000 for married couples
who were not covered by a qualified pension plan. If their adjusted
gross income was less than a specified amount-$50,000 for married
couples, a number that was gradually being increased to $80,000-the
contribution was still not taxed even though the individual was covered
by another qualified plan. 118
Taxpayers with incomes in excess of the IRA account limitation may
make after-tax contributions to an IRA, but investment returns on such
contributions are not taxed until paid out during retirement.
Withdrawals by an IRA account holder before age 59.5 are subject to a
10% penalty tax in addition to the normal income tax. Qualified retirement
accounts, where the employee changes employment, may be rolled over
into IRA accounts. 119 After roll-over, these IRAs may become selfdirected by the employee. Such accounts must be held by a qualified
custodian, such as a broker-dealer, but may be actively managed by the
employee. 120 Withdrawals after age 59.5 are subject to regular income
taxes. Mandatory withdrawals must be made after age 70.5. 121
Despite strict contribution limits, the introduction of the IRA furthered
capital ownership by employees and encouraged savings. By 1981,
115. Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 251-52 (1993) (quoting Mass. Mut.
Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 142-43 (I 985)).
116. Balkcom & Brossy, supra note 72, at 61.
117. See generally IRAs: Tax Shelters for Savings May Regain Popularity, ST.
LOUIS POST DISPATCH, Dec. 3, 1991, Dollars/Sense Pull-Out Section, at 5D (describing
benefits available from IRAs).
118. Deductability of the contribution is gradually reduced once the taxpayers
exceed the maximum level of income. DOWNES & GOODMAN, supra note 114, at 373. A
"Simple IRA" is available where an employer has less than 100 employees and does not
offer any other retirement plan. Contributions by the employer and employee of pretax
income up to $6000 per year (adjusted for inflation) are pennitted. Penalties for early
withdrawal may be higher than those for other IRA accounts. Id. at 597-98.
119. Id. at 374-75.
120. Id. at 585.
121. Id. at 598. Payout requirements for individual retirement accounts are exceedingly
complex but have been simplified to reduce some of their prior rigidity. Lynn Asinof,
U.S. Treasury Overhauls IRA Rules, WALL ST. J., Jan. 15, 2001, at CI.
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some $400 billion in assets were being held in IRA accounts. More
private retirement accounts were added in later ~ears, including the
section 401(k) accounts that were created in 1978. 22 This is a defined
contribution plan that proved to be immensely popular. By the end of
the last century, forty-one million employees were covered by such
accounts. The section 401(k) account is sponsored by the employer and
allows pretax contributions from earnings by both the employer and
employee. 123 Contributions of up to 25% of earnings are allowed to a
maximum of $10,500 per year. Penalties are imposed for preretirement
withdrawals, except that certain withdrawals are permitted for a first
home purchase, education expenses and disability. About one-third of
employers were offering these pension plans in the late 1990s. As the
result of e-commerce advances that simplified access to these accounts
through the Internet, that number is expected to double by 2005. 124
Additional private retirement accounts include Keogh plans for the
self-employed, first authorized in 1962 and broadened by legislation in
1981. They permit contributions of up to 25% of earned income up to a
maximum of $30,000. Investment returns are tax-free until withdrawal
on retirement after age 59.5. 125 Simplified Employee Pension Plan
(SEP) accounts allow contributions by employer and employee to an
IRA. Employee contributions are limited to about 13% of wages and
employer contributions are limited to 15%, up to a combined maximum
total of $30,000 per year. These plans are limited to companies having
less than twenty-five employees, and at least 50% of employees must
participate. Several restrictions exist on these plans, such as requirements
for payment of FICA taxes on contributions, and limitations on income
levels for tax deferrals. 126
More retirement programs were added to an already lengthy list of
tax-advantaged individual pension accounts. They include: ESOPS
(employee stock options plans), Money Purchase plans, and Target
Benefit plans. Roth accounts, added in 1997 by Congress, permit
122. Pamela Yip, Fow1der Says He \Vas "Dil'i11ely led," NEWS & OBSERVER
(Raleigh, NC), Jan. 14, 2001, at El, amilable at 2001 WL 3447906.
123. Pamela Yip, A wok at40J(k)'s Future: Reliremem Pla11 's 20th Birthdtzy Fillds
Workers Gaini11g More Comrol, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, NC), Jan. 14, 2001. at El.
available at 2001 WL 3447905.
124. Electro11ic 40J(k) lo Aid Small Fimis, COURIER-JOURNAL (Louisville, KYJ.
Dec. 25, 2000, at Fl, amilable al 2000 WL 7046746.
125. DOWNES & GoODMAN, supra note 114, at 399.
126. Id. at 598.
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individuals to invest up to $2000 per year. The contributions are not tax
deductible, but all earnings and principal are tax free if held in the
account for at least five years. Contributions are limited where certain
income levels are met: for example, a maximum of $160,000 for married
couples. 127 Another account, the "Education IRA," allows annual
contributions by parents of up to $500 per child until they reach age
eighteen. The contributions are not tax exempt, but investment returns
are not taxed and withdrawals are exempt from tax as long as they are
used for educational purposes before the children reach age thirty. Rothstyle income limitations were also placed on these accounts. 128
Employees of nonprofit organizations, such as schools, were allowed to
create accounts for additional retirement savings. 129 State and municipal
employees were allowed to create tax deferred plans called "457 Plans"
in recognition of their tax-deferred status under that section of the
Internal Revenue Code. 130
The tax advantages associated with private retirement accounts fueled
their growth. Forty-six percent of private sector employees had some
form of private pension coverage in 1980. 131 Pension plans held almost
$570 billion in assets in 1982, and in 1985 such plans owned about 20%
of U.S. equity securities. 132
Growth in pension plans spiraled during the market run-up in the
1990s. By 1995, 50% of workers in the grivate sector had retirement
programs in addition to Social Security. 3 The average balance in
employee 401(k) accounts was $28,509 in 1994. That number increased
by 82% to $51,939 in 1997. 134 Almost $2.4 trillion was held in IRA
accounts at the end of the century. 135
Americans in general were also becoming investors as the last century
closed. 136 The percentage of assets of American households that was
127. Id. at 373-74.
128. Corie Tuthill, Tax Incentives for Higher Education, 71 C.P.A. J. 5255 (200 I);
Pamela Yip, Parents Getting More Tax Breaks on School Costs, DALLAS MORNING
NEWS, July 9, 2001, at ID, available at 2001 WL 24408804.
129. I.R.C. § 403(b) (1994 & Supp. V 1994).
130. Id.§ 457.
13 l. Pulliam, supra note 8 I, at 5 I; Vinzant, supra note 8, at 86.
132. D' ARISTA, supra note 98, at 24, 223.
133. AM. COUNCIL OF LIFE INS., supra note 60, at 53.
134. Yip, supra note 128.
135. Brian Tumulty, Report Says IRA Assets Approach $2.4 Trillion, GANNBTI
NEWS SERV., May 15, 2000, available at 2000 WL 4399492.
136. Actually, Americans have a long history of investment, and the public has been
exposed to large investment schemes throughout history. The Continental dollar was
after all simply a note that was often sold at a discount and ultimately redeemed at par
once the Revolution was won, providing many speculators in these securities with a
profit. See generally WILLIAM J. SHULTZ & M.R. CAINE, FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT OP
THE UNITED STATES 96-98 (1937) (describing efforts of Alexander Hamilton to refund
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held in stocks reached a fifty-year high in February of 1998. 137 American
households were then holding 28% of their assets in securities. 13s The
average American home had more of its wealth in stocks than in real
estate at the end of the century. 139 Nearly half of all American
households were investing in the stock market in 2000, and one of every
three Americans was invested in a mutual fund. 140 Thirty-five percent of
shareholders in the market were blue-collar workers, and some 50% of
shareholders did not have a college degree. 141 The poorest 40% of U.S.
households were investing an average of $1600 in stocks. 142 The bad
news was that, in 1999, 40% of the 80 million baby boomers
143
approaching retirement had less than $10,000 in retirement savings.
the Revolutionary War debt). The sale of Union Bonds by Jay Cooke during lhe Civil
War was largely directed at lhe public, as were the Libeny Joans in World War I and lhe
Victory loans in World War II. See generally 1 Ews PAXSON OBERHOLTZER, JAY
COOKE: FINANCIER OF THE CNIL WAR 158-59 (1907) (describing Cooke's bond sales
operations during the Civil War); DAVIS RICH DEWEY, FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE
UNITED STATES 506 (12th ed. 1934) (describing Libeny loan programs>. The stock
market run-up in the 1920s saw a large influx of investors speculating in the market for
stocks. By the middle of the 1920s, "an average of one family in every ten held stock in
one or more corporations." NAT'L INDus. CONFERB:CE Bo., supra note 64. at 7. During
the 1980s, the New York Stock Exchange boasted of thiny million shareholders
nationwide. WILLIAM GREIDER, SECRETS OF 11iE TEMPLE: How THE FEDERAL REsERVE
RUNS THE COUNTRY 36 (1987). In 1995, approximately seventy million individuals
owned corporate stock directly or through a mutual fund, supplemental retirement fund,
or defined contribution pension accounL NEW YORK STOCK E.XCH., THE FACT BOOK 55
(1999), available at http://www. nyse.com/about/factbook99.html.
137. Greg Ip et al., This Economic Slump ls Shaping Up to Be ti Differellf
Downturn, WALL ST. J., Jan. 5, 2001, at Al; Edward Wyatt, Share of \Vet1/tl, in Stock
Holdings Hits 50-Year High, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 1998, at Al.
138. Wyatt, supra note 137, at Al.
139. Nest Eggs: Betting the House, N.Y. TL\1ES, Feb. 15, 1998, § 3, at 2. The
average net wonh of American households increased 25.7~ between 1995 and 1998.
Yochi J. Dreazen, Stock Gains Help to Propel U.S. \Vea/th, WALi.ST. J., Jan. 19, 2000,
at A2. The average household net wonh of Americans in 1972 was $65,517. That
amount increased to $358,297 by 1999. Edward Wyatt, Does the Dow Measure Up?,
N.Y. 'IThIBS, Mar. 30, 1999, at Cl. Another poll, however, indicated that one-third of
Americans had no savings and another one-third had saved less than $2500. Marron.
supra note 47, at A26.
140. Roye, supra note 1, at *l. A survey indicated in 1996, however. !hat only 18t,1,
of investors were literate about financial matters. Id.
141. Declare Victory and Go Home, ECONOMIST, Aug. 2, 1997, at 17. But see
Timothy Aeppel, At a Job Shop, It's the Year of LJ1•i11g Cautioust-y. WALL ST. J., Feb. 8,
2001, at Bl (expressing skepticism ,vith respect to claims that blue collar workers were
closely following the market).
142. Maggie Jackson, /11vesti11g i11 Market American Pastime. HERALD-SUN
(Durham, NC), SepL 13, 1999, at Al.
143. Carol Frey, The Price of Job Hopping, NEWS & OBSERVER lRaleigh, NC).
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N.

SOCIAL SECURITY VS. PRIVATE RETIREMENT ACCOUNTS

The issue of whether private retirement accounts are more effective
than Social Security for providing a secure and comfortable retirement
seems to have already been decided. As noted, the government itself
concedes Social Security does not provide adequate benefits for
retirement 144 and the system will be strained after the baby boomers
begin retiring in 2010 nearly doubling the number of elderly. 145 The
most the government can say for the present Social Security system is
that it provides a supplement to more productive private retirement
programs and acts as a safety net for those who have no other savings.
That claim, however, begs the question of why the entire system
should not be privatized. The cost of the supplemental retirement
income (or the only retirement income in the case of the poor) provided
by Social Security is quite high: 12.4% of income under $76,200 in the
year 2000. 146 An individual with an income of $50,000 contributes
$6400 per year, while an individual with an income of $25,000
contributes $3200. In exchange for those contributions, the recipient
receives benefits that will, if paid, place them only at the poverty line
upon retirement. In contrast, if $3200 per year were added to an
individual IRA by an employee at age twenty-five and compounded for
forty years, about the period required for retirement under Social
Security, at a 6% interest rate, the account would be valued at $495,000
upon retirement at age sixty-five. 147 The account would then return
almost $30,000 per year at a 6% interest without touching the principal,
which could be annuitized for even greater income or left to future
generations. Such a plan would result in funds far beyond the amount
available from Social Security.
Let us use the Social Security statements received by the author as
further examples of the drawbacks of Social Security as a retirement
program. The author started making contributions to Social Security in
1965. By the year 2000, his total employer and employee contributions
were approximately $140,000. 148 The author and his employer must
continue to make contributions of approximately $9500 each year until
he retires at the age of sixty-six, the age specified for Social Security
Nov. 7, 1999, at El.
144. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
145. Letter from the Social Security Administration, supra note 46, at I.
146. Soc. SEC. ADMIN., supra note 35, at 8.
147. Savings of $50 a week invested at 9% would grow to $1 million in forty years.
Jonathan Clements, Getting Going: What It Means to Be a Millionaire, WALL ST. J., Feb.
25, 2001, at 3, available at LEXIS, News Group File, All.
148. During six years of law school and federal government service, no contributions
were made.
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benefits, in the year 2014. This is an additional $133,000. He will then
be eligible to receive benefits of $1725 per month from Social
Security. 149 Assuming death at age eighty-two, the approximate life
expectancy of the author's age group, 150 the total benefits the author will
receive will be about $330,000, with some adjustments for inflation.
That figure would provide for a total return of less than 20% on the
$273,000 in contributions made over a period of almost fifty years. That
is about what those contributions would earn in less than four years in a
private retirement account returning 6% per year. In other words, if the
funds were placed in a private account at retirement, the author would
achieve a higher return on his contributions in the first four years of his
retirement than Social Security would pay for the entire expected sixteen
years of his retirement-plus, the author would keep the principal. If
left in a private account for the additional twelve years of his expected
retirement, the total return to the author's estate would be much more
than twice the amount paid by Social Security.
This does not make Social Security look like a very attractive
investment. Actually, it is much worse than even this analysis suggests.
Assume the author was able to exit the Social Security system after
receiving his last statement by removing his $140,000 in contributions
and placing that amount in a private IRA account that returned 6% per
year. Without contributing an extra penny, by the time of retirement at
age sixty-six, those funds would have increased in value to about
$316,000. This would be just $15,000 less than the total amount that the
author could expect under the present Social Security system. If the
additional fourteen years of contributions required by Social Security
before the author's retirement were added to that private IRA account
and compounded at 6% until retirement at age sixty-six, the value of the
account would be increased by another $200,000 or so. Thus, at
retirement the author would have in his private IRA account over
$500,000. Without touching the principal, that amount would return
over $30,000 per year if invested at 6%, about $10,000 more per year
than Social Security. If the principal were annuitized over the expected
149. Lower benefits may be oblained if retirement is taken nt age si:uy-two (Sl260
per month) or higher benefits can be received if retirement is delayed until age seventy
($2229 per month).
150. Ben Wattenberg, America by the Numbers, WALL ST. J., Jan. 3, 2001. at Al4.
For purposes of the following discussion, the author is assuming that this lifo expectancy
is a cer!ainty, which it is under annuity principles on which lifo expectancy figures are
based.
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sixteen years of retirement, the author's annual retirement income would
be far higher. 151
This still does not fully describe how unproductive Social Security is
as an investment. Remember that the author's and his employers'
current contributions to Social Security of $140,000 were made over a
period of almost thirty-five years. He received no interest on those
contributions during that period, as he would have if they were invested
in a private retirement account. If those contributions had been invested
at an average rate of 6% in conservative investments and compounded
tax free, the author would have accumulated in his private account a
substantial amount of money that would be far in excess of the $140,000
that was contributed to the government without interest for Social
Security. 152
One well-known financial analyst has posited that, if an investor had
made contributions at the rate of $2000 per year between 1963 and 1973,
and if those funds had been invested in an account indexed to the
Standard & Poor' s 500, the account would have been worth $954,680 in
the year 2000. In reaching that conclusion, the analyst assumed that the
investor contributed $2000 for only ten years and then stopped and that
the funds were invested each year at the worst possible time, when the
151. A former Governor of the Federal Reserve Board conducted a similar analysis
in the Wall Street Journal of his personal Social Security statement and concluded that
he would actually have negative return on his Social Security contributions because of
his tax bracket and the life expectancy figures for his age group. See Lawrence B.
Lindsey, I'm No Social Security Hypocrite, WALL ST. J., May 26, 2000, at A22. The
author of that article noted that his investment in a private retirement plan of about onethird of the amount he put in Social Security is projected to pay twice the monthly
amount he will receive from Social Security. Id. Other studies show that for younger
workers not paying taxes on their Social Security benefits because of low income, the
actual rate of return may be a positive 1.7% per year. Id. One report notes, however,
that minorities in particular are adversely affected by the low returns from Social
Security because of their shorter life expectancies. Bartley, supra note 51, at A39.
Another author asserts that, if a worker earning $30,000 per year were to invest 1% of
his income in stocks and 1% in bonds (instead of the 12.4% required by Social Security),
the worker would have $144,144 after forty-five years based on 1926--1999 real average
returns, far outstripping Social Security performance. Marron, supra note 47, at A26.
152. The annual Social Security statements sent to participants do not disclose the
amount of contributions; they merely set forth the amount of funds subject to
withholding. See Letter From the Social Security Administration, supra note 46, at 3.
Therefore, the projected amount of compounded earnings that could have been earned on
those contributions over the course of the author's life cannot be easily determined. For
those adventurous enough to do so, however, the Social Security Administration advises
that its Web site sets forth the percentage of withholdings each year, and those
percentages may be applied against earnings that are set forth in the annual disclosure
statement to compute contributions. Id. at 4; Soc. Sec. ADMIN., supra note 35, at I 0
(providing instructions on how to obtain a "social security statement"); Social Security
Administration, http://www.ssa.gov/mystatement (last visited Aug. 20, 2001). The
contributions can then be compounded at an assumed rate to determine possible earnings
had they been placed in a private account instead of Social Security.
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market was at its peak. 153 Even assuming the ordinary person might not
be so prescient, the hefty contributions required by Social Security
would provide the base for a solid investment program over the much
longer employment life of the average employee.
Which system makes the author more socially secure? Is it the present
Social Security system in which he receives benefits of $330,000 from
an investment of $215,000 that was saved over a course of fifty years'?
Or is it the one in which the employee receives compounded returns on
his contributions that far exceed the benefits paid by Social Security?
The answer is obvious. The private account will generate benefits
during retirement that are double or more the benefits that he could
receive from Social Security. Similarly, would a poor family be better
off with several hundred thousand dollars in accumulated wealth in a
private account that will pay far more than Social Security and allow the
principal sum to be left to children or grandchildren? When these
numbers are coupled with the approaching bankruptcy of Social
Security, the system looks less and less like a retirement program and
more and more like a tax.
V. SWITCHING OVER TO PRIVATE ACCOUNTS
The most troubling issue for the implementation of private social
security accounts is how to switch over from the present system without
throwing it into a "tail spin." 154 For example, what is to be done with the
elderly who are presently receiving benefits? What is to happen to the
contributions made by those who are not yet eligible for retirement? A
particular problem is that Social Security has been sold as an investment
program. Participants were promised a payout for their contributions.
Unfortunately, that is not the way the system was funded. Although
there are Social Security trust funds, they will be exhausted in future
years, and the system will then operate on a purely pay-as-you-go
basis. 155 This will require either onerous increases in contributions by
153.

The Most Importallt Im·esti11g Pri11ciple of All . . . S954.6SU, Lou!S

RUKEYSER'SWAU.STREET, Jan. 2001, at 3.

154. See, e.g., Kathy M. Kristof & Liz Pulliam Weston, Nell' Presidellt, New
Ec01wmic Priorities, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2000, at Cl (discussing opposition to
proposals by President Bush for partial privatization of Social Security on the grounds
that it would throw the system into a "tail spin").
155. Presently, Social Security is taking in more than it is paying out in benefits.
The surplus is placed in trust funds, which totaled about S850 billion in 1999. That
amount was projected to grow to $4 trillion, but by 2014, benefit payments will be
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young workers to fund retirement benefits, or a drastic reduction in
benefits paid to the elderly.
As it stands now, current contributors will lose some 30% of their promised
benefits starting in 2034 unless contribution levels are increased
dramatically. 156 In view of the lack of return on Social Security contributions,
young workers might be forgiven if they think that such a course would
simply constitute throwing good money after bad. That being said, how
do we deal with the obligations under Social Security while at the same
time converting the system to one of private accounts that will provide a
market return? The reality is that there is no ideal solution to the
conundrum of achieving crossover to private accounts in a fashion that is
fair to all. Everyone, except the elderly who are now dependent on
current benefits, will have to make some short-term sacrifices and be
flexible in the steps needed for a crossover program in order to obtain
long run advantages. 157 It is either that, or face large increases in
contributions to fund the deficit in the present system.
Several steps are needed to accomplish a privatization of Social
Security. The first and most critical is for new entrants to be diverted
from the existing system. 158 The system should incur no new liabilities
from those just beginning their work experience. Younger workers
should, instead, be placed in private accounts immediately. Second,
individuals, already in the system, up to some specified age (for
example, thirty-eight), should forfeit any interest in benefits from the
present Social Security system. Such a forfeit is justified on the ground
that individuals can more than make up for this forfeiture through the
compounded returns available from private social security accounts. 159
exceeding receipts and trust funds will be exhausted by 2037. Soc. SEC. ADMIN., THE
FUTURE OF SOCIAL SECURITY 6 (1999). Actually, the trust fund designation is a
misnomer. The funds are being used by the government to pay down federal debt.
When needed for Social Security, the funds will have to be reborrowed or taken from the
surplus funds. There is no "lockbox" where these funds are being held. Robert L.
Bartley, The 'Trust Fund' and 'Lockbox' Fictions, WALL ST., J., July 23, 2001, at Al5;
Daniel Patrick Moynihan & Richard Parsons, Social Security Woes Need a C11re, WALL
ST. J., June 15, 2001, at AI4.
156. See Letter from the Social Security Administration, supra note 46, at I.
157. Of course, John Maynard Keynes' familiar bon mot must be kept in mind: "In
the long run, we are all dead." See Bennett Berger, Letter to the Editor, SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRIB., Oct. 8, 2000, at G3.
158. President George W. Bush has proposed that younger workers contribute up to
2% of their income, that would otherwise go to Social Security, into a private account.
Bartley, supra note 51, at A39. Models have simulated potential earnings from such
contributions. See Martin Feldstein & Andrew Samwick, Potential Effects of Two
Percent Personal Retirement Accounts, 79 TAX NOTES 615 (1998); John D. McKinnon,
Social Security Overhaul ls Seen Cutting Benefits, WALL ST., J., Aug. 21, 2001, at A2
(establishing that a 2% contribution would not aid older workers).
159. As a legal matter, the Supreme Court has held that Social Security
contributions are not like payments for an annuity that entitle the payor to some
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The next group of participants (age thirty-eight to forty-five) is harder
to deal with in terms of an equitable solution for removing them from
the existing Social Security structure. The time they have remaining for
building a private pension to offset lost Social Security benefits is
diminishing. These individuals will also have contributed to the existing
Social Security program for some time and will have built up a
substantial level of Social Security contributions with no return. One
solution would be to grant this age group tax credits or deductions that
could be used to fund their private retirement accounts. 1w This would
offset their prior contributions, and for that reason such credits or
deductions should be considerably discounted for expected returns from
investments in their private social security accounts. Even with such
adjustments, this proposal would still reduce existing tax revenues, but
hopefully the current budget surplus would provide some cushion for
those credits. The additional funds placed in private social security
accounts should also strengthen the economy and increase government
revenues through increased returns from a growing economy.
The next age group, (forty-six to sixty), faces even more difficulties in
converting to private accounts. Nevertheless, there are solutions
available. First, this age group should be able to opt out of the current
Social Security system. In that event, they should be treated with the
same deductions or credit for prior contributions that are proposed for
the thirty-eight to forty-five age group. In addition, those opting out
should be relieved of further contributions to the existing system or at
least have those contributions reduced substantially. Instead, those
contributions would be diverted into a private account together with
other funds that the individual might want to add so that a market return
could be obtained until and during retirement. Those funds could then
be used for private social security accounts on which a market return can
be made.
This proposal, however, might not interest everyone; some people
have a significant vested interest in the current Social Security system.
There is only a little time remaining for them to receive benefits from an

contractual amount on retirement Hemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 610-11 (1960).
The Court held that contributions to Social Security were not accrued propeny rights and
that benefits could be removed or changed by Congress. Id.
160. The present Social Security system already grants credits to indMduals who
delay receipt of benefits after they reach full retirement age, which is being extended 10
age sixty-seven. Soc. SEC. ADMIN., supra note 35, at 15.
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alternate private social security account. Therefore, greater incentives
are needed to remove them from the system. Those incentives can be
both the positive ones outlined above and negative ones as well.
Negative incentives can be justified by the fact that Social Security is
facing bankruptcy. These individuals will receive only a portion of their
expected benefits, unless they pay much more into the system.
Alternatively, the younger generation must be taxed to the breaking
point to avoid a reduction of benefits under the current system. By
opting out of the system, however, the forty-six to sixty age group can
both avoid additional contributions and spare their children. For those
who do not opt out, benefits must be reduced. That is a bitter pill to
swallow, but the fact is that the Social Security system is bankrupt, and
must be liquidated at less than 100 cents to the dollar unless additional
backbreaking amounts of contributions are imposed.
The reduction of benefits for those not opting out could be
accomplished on a "progressive" basis. For example, those reporting
income over specified amounts (say, $50,000 per year) might have their
benefits reduced entirely. The unfairness of this forfeiture could be at
least partially offset by tax credits or deductions. 161 The amount of the
credit could be time valued and based on the number of years that the
individual was denied benefits to which they would have otherwise been
entitled.
Another approach would be to establish a form of a Brady Plan such
as was employed to refund defaulted Latin American debt near the end
of the last century. 162 The nature of these programs varied, but all
included forgiving debt in exchange for guarantees of performance or
increased interest. Older Social Security participants could be bought
out under a similar arrangement that would reduce the system's
liabilities and allow a market return for the participant from such debt.
To use the author's situation as an example of how this might work: the
author and his employers have paid into the system approximately
$140,000. The author would be quite happy if he could exit the system
now with a payment of $50,000 that could be converted into a
161. The estate tax would be an obvious source for such credits. Efforts have been
made to eliminate this tax on the federal level. See, e.g., Eric Pianin & John Lancaster,
Tax Cuts Gain Momentum, WASH. POST, Jan. 23, 2001, at A2 (discussing tax cut
proposals that would eliminate the federal estate tax). That repeal met opposition from
billionaires and others with a stake in the current system of philanthropy and estate
planning, John D. McKinnon & Shailagh Murray, Taxes Expected to Still Affect largest
Estates, WALL ST. J., Feb. 20, 2001, at A24, but Congress phased out this tax over an
extended period with a possible renewal in later years. The Economic Growth and Tax
Reconcilation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, 115 Stat. 38.
162. For a description of Brady Plan refinancings see Elliot Assocs., v. Banco De
La Nacion, 194 F.3d 363, 366 (2d Cir. 1999).
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contribution into a private IRA account that accumulates tax-free. 163 If
invested at 6%, the $50,000 payment would recover the S 140,000 in
about eighteen years, well before the author reaches the end of his life
expectancy.
As noted, another incentive should be reduced contributions to the
Social Security system that could be placed instead into a private IRA.
In the author's case, over $100,000 could be placed in an IRA under
such a plan, based on the continuance of contributions of 2% into Social
Security and the rest paid into a private social security account. This
arrangement, at least to the author, is far preferable to holding $140,000
in a bankrupt system to which an additional $126,000 or more in
contributions must be made. Of course, this will increase demand on tax
revenue, but that burden is present in any event-either through
continuing and increased assessments for Social Security or because of
reduced benefits in the future. A Brady Plan approach can help reduce
those obligations and further divert future obligations from the system.
The toughest group to deal with is the seniors over age sixty. Time
has run out on them. Individuals in this age group, even those not
already retired, will be unable to accumulate savings and receive
compounded returns in amounts adequate for their needs. Many
members of this age group will be largely dependent on their Social
Security benefits. Those individuals must be protected and their benefits
continued. Government officials have good reasons to do so. Aside
from moral concerns with the effect on low-income elderly, this age
group is a powerful political force. Led by the American Association of
Retired Persons (AARP) with its thirty-four million members, this group
of citizens is the "800-pound gorilla" in American politics.•~ Bill
Thomas, Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, has
claimed that this special interest group has used its political muscle to
further government programs, making it the beneficiary of the "largest
intergenerational transfer of wealth in history ... u,s Reform for this age
163. This payment could be made in the fonn of a U.S. government bond. Ta"t
credits or deductions in that amount would serve equally well.
164. Clyde H. Farnsworth, The Disco\·ery of Political Muscle, N.Y. TL\IES, Sep!. 11.
1987, at A20; Ira J. Hadnot, Joseph S. Perkins, /11ten•iell', DAU.AS MORNING NEWS, O.:c.
28, 1998, at IJ, available at LEXIS, News Group File, All; Edi1orial, Soda/ Security
Shouldn't Divide Us, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Feb. 22, 2001, at 12A. cn·ailab/e at 2001
WL6964324.
165. Editorial, Social Security Should11't DMde Us, supra nole 16-J, at 12A. Baby
boomers, however, may be receiving some of that wealth back in the form of
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group will be difficult, but the picture is not entirely bleak. This liability
will be largely eliminated over the next twenty years as mortality thins
the ranks of this age group. Morbid, yes-but the sad fact is that each
succeeding year will witness a reduction in liabilities as death takes its
inevitable toll. 166 The problem is one-off in that the liability will not be
recurring if younger workers are diverted from the existing Social
Security system.
Although the liability to the existing millions of elderly receiving
Social Security benefits will be enormous, there are some ways to reduce
it. Some of this liability can be met through the Social Security trust
funds that have already been built up to meet future shortfalls.
Liabilities could be further reduced by full taxation of Social Security
benefits. This will conform Social Security income to benefits paid out
under private pensions. Another means of reducing liabilities to these
seniors would be to cut benefits for those with high incomes, say in
excess of $100,000. Again, this is unfair to those affected, since
contributions were made on the understanding that these individuals
would receive benefits, whatever their income level. 167 The harshness of
this action could be ameliorated, however, by giving a tax credit to such
individuals on their estate taxes that would offset the lost benefits. 168
These changes will accomplish a crossover to private pensions for
some, but the critical question remains: how to fund benefits payable to
those too old to be diverted to private social security accounts. Current
estimates of solvency until 2015 are based on continued contributions.
That could be offset to some extent by opt-outs and mortality, but the
liability remains enormous. Two-thirds of America's elderly are
dependent on Social Security as their major source of income. It is the

inheritances from their parents and other elderly relatives. Marsha King, Boomer
Metamorphoses, SEATTLE TIMES, May 8, 2000, at Al, available at 2000 WL 5534930.
The AARP may also be losing some of its power as baby boomers dilute their views.
Steven A. Holmes, The World According to MRP, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2001, at HI.
166. The trend in earlier retirements seems to be leveling off, which should further
reduce pressure on the Social Security system from seniors. Mary Williams Walsh,
Reversing Decades-Long Trend, Americans Retiring later in life, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26,
2001, at Al.
167. Even though the Supreme Court has ruled that there is no right to accrued
benefits from Social Security contributions, Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 611
(1960), in reality, as the Social Security Administration has stated, "Social Security is
based on a simple concept. When you work, you pay taxes into the system, and when
you retire or you become disabled, your spouse and your dependent children receive
monthly benefits that are based on your earnings. And, your survivors collect benefits
when you die." Soc. SEC. ADMIN., supra note 35, at 7.
168. As noted above, the Social Security Administration is already providing credits
and increased benefits for those deferring the receipt of benefits. See supra note 160 and
accompanying text.
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only source of income for one-third of the elderly. 1h9 The easiest, but
still painful, method would be to make those payments out of general
taxation so that younger workers could use their existing Social Security
contributions to fund private accounts. That would, of course, place
enormous pressure on general revenues. Some relief could be obtained
from the projected large budget surpluses, but that might conflict with
plans for cutting taxes. 170 In any event, the temporary demands of this
crossover period would be offset by the eventual elimination of Social
Security taxes, and increased investments from private accounts should
generate more taxable income. 171

VI.

SURVIVORS AND DISABILITY BENEFITS

Two other important aspects of Social Security must be considered in
switching to a private system: disability and survivor benefits. About
one-third of Social Security beneficiaries are not retirees. They include
7.5 million individuals receiving survivor benefits and six million
receiving disability benefits. 172 According to the Social Security
Administration, its disability benefit is equivalent to a $233,000 private
disability insurance policy, 173 and its survivor benefits are equal to a
169. Soc. SEC. ADMIN., supra note 155, at 2.
170. At year-end 2000, a $5 trillion federal budget surplus was being projected for
the next ten years. Richard W. Stevenson, JO-Year Estimate of Budget Surplus Surges
Once More, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 2000, at Al. The Democrats, however. wanted to U!>C
a portion of that amount to pay off the existing national debt of $3.4 trillion, \\ bile the
Republicans were seeking a $1.6 trillion tax cut over the next decade. Id. Ne\·enhele~.
President George Bush announced budget plans to set aside a large portion of the surplus
to shore up a privatized social security system. \Vashi11gto11 \Vire, WALL ST. J., Feb. 23,
2001, at Al. Although the actual tax cut was smaller than sought by the Republicans,
the budget surplus was shrinking as the economy declined in 200 l. See The Economic
Growth and Tax Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, I 15 Stat. 38 (selling
forth the tax reduction program).
171. See generally Pete Du Pont, Called to Accoum, WAl.l. ST. J., June 6, 2001, at
A26 (describing how privatized social security accounts could reduce need for Social
Security payments). Another method for achieving crossover would be to tum the Social
Security system into a needs-based welfare program. This would reduce liabilities but
would not, unjustifiably, encounter a storm of opposition from those currently r.xeiving
benefits. Such action would electrify this "third rail" of politics and result in turmoil.
Many Social Security recipients believe, quite reasonably, that their contributions were
made on the promise of future benefits. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
172. Soc. SEC. ADMIN., supra note 155, at 3.
173. Id. The disability features of Social Security are limited. Unlike many private
plans, Social Security does not recognize partial disabilities, at least for younger
workers. Soc. SEC. ADMIN., supra note 35, at 16.
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$354,000 life insurance policy. 174 As these claims suggest, however, the
risks covered by these Social Security benefits may be readily covered
by private insurance. The real issue is one of dealing with existing
beneficiaries. 175 They cannot simply be cut off, which raises further
concerns as to the ultimate cost of transforming Social Security to a
private system. The problem is how to get off the treadmill. As is the
case for retirement benefits, the key to that conversion is to cut off entry
into the system and to then liquidate existing obligations. Once again,
actuarial figures for these beneficiaries make this a temporary problem if
entry into the system is stopped.
For those not already receiving benefits, private insurance in two
forms is needed: disability and life insurance. Life insurance is already
an essential part of estate planning for most Americans, having been sold
throughout the United States since the nineteenth century and having
received widespread acceptance. 176 The assets of life insurance companies
grew by over 800% between 1906 and 1938. 177 The assets of insurance
companies tripled between 1945 and 1960. 178 In 1982, their assets
totaled $700 billion, which was more than that of the nation's fifty
largest corporations, 179 and that number swelled to $2.1 trillion in
1995. 180 The average amount of life insurance per household was then
$124,100. 181 By 1996, 67% of adult Americans and nine out of ten
households were covered by life insurance. 182 One hundred fifty-four
million Americans were covered by some form of life insurance. 183
Although this left over 100 million Americans uncovered, presumably
many of those individuals were elderly or youn~ people who had no
dependents and little need for survivor insurance. 84 Yet, even allowing
174. Soc. SEC. ADMIN., supra note 155, at 3.
175. See generally Robert Pear, Study Says Disabled Would Lose Benefits Under
Plan to Revamp Social Security, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2001, at Al3 (discussing concerns
that individuals currently receiving Social Security benefits could be adversely affected
by privatization proposals).
176. For a description of the growth of the insurance industry in the United States,
see Lissa L. Broome & Jerry W. Markham, Banking and Insurance: Before and After the
Gramm-Leac/z-Bliley Act, 25 J. CORP. L. 723 (2000).
177. TEMP. NAT'L ECON. COMM., 76TH CONG., INVESTIGATION OF CONCENTRATION
OF EcONOMIC POWER, MONOGRAPH No. 28-28A, at 9 (Senate Comm. Print 1940).
178. MARTIN MAYER, THE BANKERS 190 (1974).
179. Big on Profits, Low on Returns-Insurance, Says Andrew Tobias, Is America's
Protection Racket, PEOPLE MAG., Apr. 12, 1982, at 77, available at LEXIS, News Group
File, All.
180. AM. COUNCIL OF LIFE INS. supra note 60, at 7.
181. Id. at 6.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Although the amount of insurance in force increased between 1975 and 1995,
the number of purchasers declined between 1993 and 1995. Id. The number of new life
insurance policies fell from some 18 million in 1993 to about 11. l million in 1997, a
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for those individuals, a part of the population remains with no life
insurance to protect dependents other than that available under the
present Social Security system. In order to avoid having survivors of
uninsured individuals become wards of the state, private social security
accounts should probably include a life insurance feature. Fortunately,
this insurance is relatively cheap for most individuals. Further, at least
in the case of term insurance, it is the cheapest when needed mostwhen the insured is young and facing the need for extended survivor
benefits for young children. 185 As the insured grows older. the cost of
term insurance will increase, but the need for insurance diminishes as
dependents become independent and the insured builds an estate for a
surviving spouse through the investment features of a retirement
account 186
Disability insurance is also a concern. 187 The United States is
becoming less and less a manufacturing nation where there is a high rate
of disability from job-related accidents. 188 Nevertheless, disability is
three to five times more likely than premature death for younger
workers. 189 Workman's compensation provides some insurance for
work-related disabilities, 190 and private disability insurance is widely
available. Nevertheless, perhaps because of existing Social Security and
state disability programs, some two-thirds of workers do not have
reduction of 37%. Joseph B. Treaster, Ufe lflsura11ce loses Ground CIS Jm·estme111
Options Grow, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 1998, at Al.
185. Term insurance accounted for about 48% of life insurance in 1994, up from
38% a year earlier. AM. COUNCILOFLlFElNS., supra note 60, at 13. 26 ( 1996).
186. In January 2001, an online service was quoting a ten-year guaranteed
maximum annual premium of $830 for $350,00 of life insurance for a nonsmoking
individual aged fifty-two ,vith no health problems. In contrast, a twenty-five-year-old
with the same profile would pay an annual premium of only $217 for the same amount of
insurance. Netquote, at http://www.netquote.com (websilC visited and quotes generated Jan. 26.
2001).
187. Current Social Security proposals envision a reduction in Social Security
benefits as they are replaced by private accounts, but there is concern that this will
reduce disability benefits for those who have no substitute for such reduc1ions. Pear.
supra note 175, at Al3.
188. Workplace deaths have dropped by nearly half over 1he last 1wen1y years.
Workplace Fatalities Nearly Hali-ed i11 20 Years, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2001. at Al7.
Presumably, the rate of disabilities has also fallen.
189. Deborah Mendenhall, A Disahlb1g 0111issio11: Disability /ns11ra11ce less Pop11IC1r
Thon Life But COIi Be More lmportallt, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Nov. 20, 2000. al
Bl, available at 2000 WL 27786490.
190. See generally Philip Buffone, Union Employees Hm·e Made SC1criftces,
Worked With Falls on Cutting City Costs, BUFFALO NEWS, Dec. 24, 2000, al NC-2
(describing state disability programs).
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disability insurance. 191 It is also an expensive item that may require
premium payments of three to five percent of a worker's salary,
depending on the dangers associated with the employee's occupation. 192
Nevertheless, this still seems small in comparison to the total 12.4% of
income demanded from Social Security.

VII.

PRIVATE SOCIAL SECURITY ACCOUNTS

Switching to private Social Security accounts raises a number of other
issues. For example, should there be minimum contribution requirements to
assure that individuals do not become wards of the state in their old age?
Should there be maximum contribution limits on these accounts, at least
to the extent that they are tax advantaged? What custodian requirements
should be imposed, and should these accounts be federally insured in the
event of the custodian's insolvency? Should there be restrictions on the
nature of the investments in the accounts that would protect account
holders from undue risks? What protections are available to protect
account holders from fraud, overreaching and unsuitable investment
recommendations in the investment of contributions to these accounts?
As will be discussed, these are valid, but resolvable concerns.
A. Contribution Requirements and Limitations

Private sector IRA accounts are all spurred by tax advantages in one
form or another. Congress, however, has sharply limited their advantages
and discouraged such investments beyond minimal levels. Contribution
limits and income cut-offs, therefore, assure that these programs have
only limited effects in substituting for Social Security. This seems
somewhat perverse in view of the fact that savings rates in the United
States are at record low levels. They have "dwindled to virtually
nothing," 193 and even became negative at the end of the last century. 194
191. Marci Bailey, Financially, More Of Us Are Prepared For Death Than For
Chronic Disability: Inability To Work ls Greater Risk For Many, Bttt Few Buy
Insurance, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 26, 2000, at F5.
192. Id. The cost of private insurance will increase if Social Security benefits are
eliminated because most private policies do not cover an employee after he reaches full
retirement age (which is being increased to age sixty-seven) under Social Security. The
private companies assume that Social Security benefits will cover the employee after that
age, and additional rider is required to obtain continuing coverage. Bailey, sttpra note
l 91, at F5 (discussing a reduction in benefit payments after retirement).
193. Robert D. Hershey, Jr., Putting the Clamps on Consumers Accttstomed to
Borrowing Freely, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 2000, at Cl.
l 94. Maya MacGuineas, The Saving Grace of a little Federal Debt, WASH. POST,
Jan. 7, 2001, at B2 (noting that the savings rate had declined to a negative .08 percent).
Retirement savings prognosis has gone up and down with the stock market. Compare
John O'Neil & Marjorie Connelly, As Savings Go Up, Worries Go Down (A little), N.Y.
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Moreover, limiting and discouraging retirement savings at a time when
Social Security cannot provide adequate benefits, and is itself bankrupt,
seems counterintuitive and incongruous. Nevertheless, the government
is concerned that retirement programs will become a tax shelter for the
wealthy. Without going too far out on the Laffer curve, however, that
concern must be weighed in light of the returns from increased
investments that can be taxed. 195
Because of such considerations, the minimum contribution requirement
seems facially easy to answer. 196 Like Social Security, these accounts
will seek to ensure that the elderly do not become destitute once they
stop working. The state has an interest in ensuring that they do not
become wards who will drain tax revenues through need-based welfare

Mar. 21, 2001, at Hl (describing sharp jump in !he number of Americans saving
for retirement), with Glenn Ruffenach, Fell'er Americans Sai·e for Their Reriremelll,
WAU.. ST. J., May 10, 2001, at A2 (discussing survey finding !hat fewer Americans arc
saving for retirement). Some economists argue !hat !he savings rate would actually be
quite high if retained capital gains are added to !he fonnula. Exposing the Fraying Edges
in the Fabric of the Economy, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2000, at C4. This argument scelll!t
to downplay !he fact !hat new funds are not being added to existing sa\·ings. An
economy cannot depend on the hope !hat it can fund growlh solely Ihrough rising market
prices. The downturn in the market at the end of !he century underscores the danger of
such an approach. Conversely, savings alone are not sufficient to fuel an economy !hat
will boost individual wea!Ih. Japan has !he highest savings rate in !he world and
personal financial assets exceed $12 trillion, but !hat country's economy has been mired
in recession since its own bubble burst several years ago. Those sa\fogs have not
restored the economy because !hey are not productively employed. Instead, !hey arc
held in postal and olher accounts that do not funnel capital to businesses. See gmertzlly
Michael A. Lev, Japan's Trillion-Dollar Re,·olurion, Cm. TRIB., Sept. 10, 1999, § 1. at I
(discussing Japan's savings patterns and its economy).
195. The Laffer curve theory, named after economist Arthur B. Laffer, who was
said to have formulated the concept on !he back of a napkin at a restaurant, posits !hat
cutting taxes will increase revenues by increasing incentives to cam additional ta'l(able
income. Peter Passell, Economic Scene: Loll'er Income Taxes Stimulate rhe Economy.
The Sequel., N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 1994, at D2. The theory also recognizes !hat cutting
taxes will at some point cause lower tax revenues, as where !he ta'\ is cut to zero.
Donald Ratajczak, Consequences of U.S. Tax Cut Need More S111dy, All.ANTA Jou14..;ALCONST., July 25, 1999, at D2. Controversy focuses on where !hat break point is located.
Id. The Laffer curve was given some credence after Congress cut capital gains taxes
substantially. Id. Instead of the expected $50 billion in reduced revenue from !hat cut.
capital gains collections actually increased by $100 billion. Richard Gilder & Thomas L
Rhodes, Bush Needs a Bigger Tax Cut, WAU..ST. J., Feb. 8, 2001, at A22.
196. The Chilean privatized social security system requires a payment into a private
account of a minimum of 10% of each worker's salary. Clifford Krauss, Pensioners
Quiver as Markets Fall, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 1998, § 4, at 4. Australia will be
requiring employers and employees to contribute a total of I 2Q- to their private
retirement accounts. See infra note 342 and accompanying text.
TIMES,
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programs. 197 Therefore, mandatory contributions do not seem to be unfair,
particularly if those contributions replace the present payroll tax for
Social Security contributions. Moreover, a private social security
account will belong entirely to the owner, even if access is restricted
until retirement. The amount of the minimum contribution will
necessarily be tied to the owner's income level, but should be adequate
to assure a minimum level of retirement benefits, if invested in
instruments with a modest rate of return.
Setting a maximum limitation on contributions raises more complex
issues. The concern here is that the accounts will become a tax shelter
for the wealthy. This is why income and maximum annual contribution
limits are placed on current individual retirement account programs.
The present limits on those accounts, however, are quite low and
discourage contributions in amounts that would allow a generous estate
buildup from compounded returns. 198 More importantly, restrictive
limits overlook the fact that income is likely to be low early in one's
career, and then rise with maturity. At the same time, the demands of
children and home ownership will limit the amount of discretionary
income available for retirement contributions in the early stages of a
career even while income levels are rising. When income is freed from
those family obligations, however, contribution limits and the limited
time left to benefit from compounded savings curb the value of the
retirement account. More money is needed at the back end to gain the
advantages from compounded returns that would have been available
earlier if income were greater.
The wiser course here would be to impose very high maximum limits
on the amount of untaxed contributions over the life of the individual. 199
197. This authority is justified under the taxing power of Congress because it will
be based on tax-advantaged contributions and justified by goals similar to those in Social
Security. See generally Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937) (upholding required
Social Security contributions under this authority).
198. Consideration is being given to increasing those limits, but even those
proposals are low and inflexible. See David Rogers, Retirement Savings leads Tax-Cw
Initiatives, WALL ST. J., Jan. 26, 2001, at Al6 (discussing proposed legislation that
would increase contribution limits); Tax Report, WALL ST. J., Jan. 17, 2001, at Al
(discussing an increase of maximum IRA contribution from $2000 to $5000 and noting
that the present $2000 maximum limit has been in place since the early 1980s). That
legislation did not pass, but efforts continue for its adoption. House Bill Raises IRA,
40/(k) limits, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, NC), May 3, 2001, at DI. The Economic
Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, 115 Stat. 38, did
allow graduated contribution increases that will reach $5000 in 2008. Catch-up
contributions are also allowed where an employee is over fifty and fails to make a
contribution in prior years.
199. One proposal seeks to raise contribution limits by $5000 for ten years and then
remove them entirely in order to encourage savings and investment. Gilder & Rhodes,
supra note I 95, at A22.
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Minimum contributions would have to be made each year by the
employed, but greater amounts could be contributed up to this limit at
any time before retirement. All contributions should be allowed to
compound tax free until withdrawn at retirement. zoo This system would
allow employees with layoffs to make up for lost contributions.
Athletes, entertainers, authors and others with a few high-income years
could also benefit from such an approach by effectively spreading
earnings over their lifetimes for contribution purposes. Individuals with
higher incomes at the end of their careers could add greater amounts to
make up for lower contributions in earlier years. All would benefit from
an increased incentive to save greater amounts earlier in order to take
advantage of compounding.
Another consideration is simplicity. Under the current regime of individual
retirement accounts, employees may have multiple accounts with varying
restrictions and limitations. These might include SEP accounts, Roth
accounts, IRAs, Keogh accounts, 403(b) and 403(k) accounts?J 1
Employees are changing jobs with increasing frequency and may have
participated in several different retirement programs that cannot always
be rolled into one account. They may also have state or federal pension
plans and defined benefit plans picked up sometime during a career.
The author and his wife, for example, are presently monitoring nine
separate retirement accounts in addition to their two Social Security
accounts.202 Congress would do everyone a favor by consolidating all
individual retirement accounts under a single umbrella with uniform
requirements. This would reduce monitoring costs and account fees, and
allow cost savings.
For example, many mutual funds have breakpoints that allow reduced
commissions for larger purchases, and brokerage firms may charge
200. Additional complex issues are raised by funds remaining in the account at
death. For example, should they be taxed as income to the estate at that time or treated
as part of the estate for estate tax purposes'? Repeal of the estate ta.x may negate this
issue, if that repeal is permanent See The Economic Growth and Tax Reconciliation Act
of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, 115 Stat 38 (setting forth the gradual estate ta., repeal that
will expire in ten years).
201. See supra notes I 16-30 and accompanying text.
202. This number of accounts would have been even larger had the author and h1~
wife not cashed out their government retirement accounts. As it b, 1heir r.:tircm;:nt
accounts include Roth accounts, individual IRAs, SEP accounts, a Money Purch~c plan.
a Keogh plan, a university sponsored TIAA-CREF annuity plan, and a !>epar-Jlc 4U31bl
annuity plan. The Economic and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L No.
107-16, 115 Stat 38, does allow some consolidation oflRA and Simple IRA Accounb.
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administration fees for each account held by each customer. Spouses
should also be able to combine their accounts into joint ownership to
further the efficiency of their retirement savings. Joint ownership would
also simplify distribution of their property on death.
Another problem that must be addressed is the nature of restrictions on
the withdrawal of funds from an individual retirement account.
Presently, restrictions on withdrawals are imposed on IRA accounts that
are designed to assure that the funds are used for retirement and not as a
tax shelter for discretionary income. 203 IRA and similar account holders
may begin withdrawing funds at age 59.5, while Social Security
provides for reduced payments starting at age sixty-two, higher
payments for those waiting until age sixty-seven, and even higher
payments for those waiting until age seventy before retiring. Private
IRA accounts are required to make minimum payouts once the
individual reaches a specified age. Private IRA accounts also allow
withdrawals without penalty for certain "emergency" situations such as
disability.
Should the present private IRA account restrictions be extended to
private social security accounts? The answer is that some restrictions
are probably in order. Account owners should not be allowed to
withdraw funds before retirement in other than emergency situations,
lest they become wards of the state when they retire without adequate
resources. The present retirement age of 59.5 for individual IRAs seems
reasonable, but account holders must realize that they have a life
expectancy well beyond that age and that resources must be conserved
accordingly. In contrast, minimum payouts seem to be simply a tax
collection measure. Their application to private social security accounts
will depend on policies governing the taxing of the elderly and budget
demands, rather than economics.
B. Custodian Requirements
Another issue to be addressed for private social security accounts is
the nature and scope of custodian requirements-determining where
contributions and accrued returns should be held for safekeeping. There
are a number of such repositories for private pensions and individual
retirement accounts. To the extent that private social security accounts
are funded under the umbrella of a defined benefit plan, the Pension
Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) was created specifically to

203. Nevertheless, 20% of individuals spend their 40 I (k) distributions when
changing employment instead of rolling them over into a new plan. Marron, supra note
47, atA26.
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provide insurance for defined benefit plans that are not properly funded
and have more than twenty-five employees. 104 In 1997, the PBGC was
providin? payments to 400,000 workers who were victims of underfunded
plans.20 There are limitations on that insurance that limit coverage to
about a maximum of $35,000 per year per person.20 ti PBGC was also
facing a funding crisis in the early 1990s, having a deficit of almost S4
billion before changes at the agency allowed a recovery and even a
surplus in 1996.207 The Retirement Protection Act of 1994 increased
funding requirements and imposed restrictions on underfunded plans,203
which resulted in closer policing of underfunded plans. It did not,
however, ensure that increased savings and an economic downturn will
not result in large amounts of losses that the government might have to
bear.
Defined benefit plan obligations also raise concerns of inflation; that
is, the defined benefit may be rendered inadequate by inflation, particularly
when the retiree is long-lived. Perhaps an indexing requirement could
be imposed on such funds that would compensate for the effects of
inflation. The employer could guard against the liabilities from such a
provision by hedging with derivative instruments. 109
Another drawback for defined benefit plans is the fact that the
complexities and liabilities imposed by ERISA, as well as the
restrictions imposed by the guarantee program, make defined benefit
plans expensive, preventing small employers from having such pro~
and discouraging larger employers from using this type of plan.210

204. See supra note 114 and accompanying text (describing background of the
creation of this agency and insurance limitations).
205. Claudia Levy, Martin Slate Dies at 51; Led Pension Agency, WASH. POST.
Feb. 26, 1997, at B5. At that time, forty-two million workers were covered by defined
benefit plans. Id.
206. DOWNES & GoODl\lAN, supra note 114, at 498.
207. Levy, supra note 205.
208. The PBGC succeeded in convincing General Motors to add Sl O billion to its
underfunded pension plans. Id.
209. Several instruments are available for hedging against inflation risks including
some federal bonds whose returns are based on increased inflation rates. Of course,
some of these instruments themselves may pose investment risks. See generally Jerry
W. Markham, "Confederate Bonds," "General Custer," and the Reg11l11tion of
Derivative Fil1011cial Instrumems, 25 SETON HALL L. REv. l 0994) {describing large
losses incurred from unregulated derivative instruments).
210. See Philip R. Lochner, Jr., Economic Reg11latio11 and Democmtic G1wt•mme111.
25 J. CORP. L. 831, 834 (2000) (describing how ERISA has discouraged the use of
defined benefit plans).
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These weaknesses in the defined benefit plan are dramatically apparent
from their declining popularity. The number of defined benefits plans
decreased from 114,000 in 1985 to 40,000 in the year 2000. 211 An
alternative is the defined contribution plan that provides a means to
guard against the risk of inflation. 212 By the end of the century, defined
contribution plans outnumbered defined benefit plans by a ratio of fourto-one. 213 From these figures, it would appear that America has decided
that defined benefit plans are not the best method for assuring a
comfortable retirement, which brings us back to the individual
retirement account.
The maintenance of individual social security accounts raises some
complex custodial issues since there are alternatives available that vary
in their nature and are subject to differing regulations having disparate
insurance schemes for protection from insolvency. For example, commercial
banks, which have had considerable experience in administering common
trust funds and pension funds, 214 are a logical custodian for private social
security accounts and appear to be safe. Banks are subject to intensive
regulation at both the state and federal level. 215 Banks must meet
complex capital and reserve requirements designed to assure their
financial stability. 216 Regulations are in place for the handling of trust
funds. 217 Presumably, the trust departments are shielded from the claims
of general creditors in the event of bankruptcy since this is not bank
property. This might provide protection in addition to that available
from the FDIC. Bank customers are insured by the FDIC for up to
$100,000 for funds on deposit at the banks, 218 which is less than the total
211. Lee, supra note 114, at 2000 WL 5532516.
212. See generally Albert 8. Crenshaw, Redefined Retirements: Today's Plans Put
Workers 011 the Hook for Their Benefits, WASH. POST, Jan. 28, 2001, at H2 (describing
defined contribution plans and their increased popularity and risks).
213. Pulliam, supra note 81, at T51.
214. See generally Inv. Co. Inst. v. Conover, 790 F.2d 925 (D.C. Cir. 1986)
(holding that banks could properly manage a collective trust for individual retirement
accounts).
215. See, e.g., In re Bank of New York, 323 N.E.2d 700 (N.Y. 1974) (explaining
that bank-administered common trust funds are examined periodically to judge the
prudence of investments).
216. For a discussion of bank capital requirements see BD. OF GOVERNORS or nm
FED. RESERVE SYS., TRADING AND CAPITAL-MARKETS ACTIVITIES MANUAL, § 2110.1
(Apr. 2000). For reserve requirements see Reserve Requirements of Depository
Institutions (Regulation D), 12 C.F.R. pt. 204 (2001 ); see also First Bank & Trust Co. v.
Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 605 F. Supp. 555 (E.D. Ky. 1984) (describing
extension of federal reserve requirements to state banks).
217. See generally Cent. Nat'I Bank of Mattoon v. United States Dep't of Treasury,
912 F.2d 897 (7th Cir. I 990) (describing Comptroller of the Currency's regulation of
trust department activities of national banks); In re Bank of New York, 323 N.E.2d ut
700-04 (describing state regulation of state bank fiduciary activities).
218. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(a)(l)(B) (1994).
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available from the PBIC.219 The amount of FDIC insurance seems a bit
low in that most private social security accounts will exceed that level
after several years of saving. The customer could split their investments
among a number of banks, but this would be inconvenient. The
customer could have brokers do this for them, but there are currently
restrictions in place on the use of brokered deposits.2:o Congress may
also be reluctant to increase insurance levels, particularly after the
debacle in the savings and loan industry in the 1980s that nearly
bankrupted the deposit insurance system and resulted in a massive
regulatory restructuring. 221
Consequently, private social security
account holders may be left to do their own shopping for multiple bank
custodians for their private social security accounts.
Another currently popular depository for retirement funds is with
broker-dealers in the securities industry. They too are elaborately
regulated. 222 The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 requires brokerdealers to pass a background check and register with the Securities and
Exchange Commission.223 They must meet extensive books and record
keeping requirements. 224 The SEC mandates a complex accounting
scheme for its net capital rule that is designed to assure that the brokerdealer has adequate funds on hand to meet customer obligations. 225
Early warning requirements are imposed where a broker-dealer is having
219. For a discussion of aggregation issues raised by 1he SI00,000 accoum
limitation for retirement accounts see FDIC, Federal Deposit /11s11ra11ce Corpora1io11:
Your Insured Deposits, at http://www.fdic.gov/deposil/deposits/index.hlml (lasl visi1cd
Jan. 27, 2001).
220. See generally FAIC Sec., Inc. v. Uniled Slales, 768 F.2d 352 (D.C. Cir. 1985)
(striking initial attempt to regulate deposit brokers); 12 U.S.C. § 1831f(a) (19941
(prohibiting banks that are not well capitalized from accepting brokered deposits).
221. See generally H.R. REP. No. 101-54, pt. 1 (1989) (describing the sa\·ings and
loan debacle); KrrIT CAI.AVITA ET AL, FRAUD AND POUTICS IN nm SAVINGS AND LO.;\N
CRISIS (1997) (same).
222. See generally 23A JERRY W. MARKHAM & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, BROKER·
DEALER OPERATIONS UNDER SECURITIES AND COMMODmES LAW: FINANCIAL
REsPONSIBil.ffiES CREDIT REGULATION AND CUSTOMER PROTECTION (2000) (describing
SEC regulation of broker-dealers); David A. Liplon, A Primer 011 Broker•Dt•tzler
Registration, 36 CATii. U. L. REV. 899 (1987) (same).
223. 15 U.S.C. § 780 (1994) (outlining registration rcquircmcnl!>); 17 C.F.R. §
240.17f-2 (2000) (regarding fingerprinting rcquircmenl for background checks of
associated persons employed by broker-dealers).
224. 17 C.F.R. § 240. l 7a-3 (2000).
225. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-l (2000). See Touchc Ross & Co. \'. Rcding1on. 442
U.S. 560, 570 n.10 (1979) ("The net capital rule requires a broker 10 main1ain a cenain
minimum ratio of net capital to aggregale indebtedness so that the broker•s assc1s will
always be sufficiently liquid to enable him to meet all of his currcnl obligations").
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financial difficulties that are impairing its capital, and broker-dealers
must cease business when they fail to meet the required minimums. 226
Customer funds must be held in special custodial accounts that are
designed to protect customer assets from the claims of creditors. 227 In
the event of bankruptcy of a broker-dealer, the customer is insured by
the Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC), but that insurance
covers only losses due to the broker-dealer's insolvency, such as missing
securities. It does not cover losses on investments held by the brokerdealer. SIPC insurance is now $500,000 per customer, of which
$100,000 may be in cash. 228 Many broker-dealers also have private
insurance for amounts even beyond this figure. 229
The federal securities laws provide other protections for individually
managed retirement accounts. For example, broker-dealers are prohibited
from making recommendations for unsuitable investments. 230 Broker226. 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-l 1 (2000) (concerning early warning requirements). The
SEC staff has stated that:
[T]he net capital rule ... is an integral part of the Commission's financial
responsibility program for broker-dealers. The rule prescribes minimum
liquidity standards for broker-dealers, its purpose being to ensure that brokerdealers maintain sufficient liquid assets to satisfy promptly the claims of
customers, plus a "cushion" of liquid assets in excess of liabilities to cover
potential market and credit risks. In addition to the net capital rule there is an
"early warning requirement." The "early warning requirement" serves to give
the Commission advance notice of a broker-dealer approaching its minimum
net capital requirement in which event the Commission monitors the financial
health of the broker-dealer.
Mr. & Mrs. Glenn Gregory, SEC No-Action Letter (Feb. 8, 1983), 1983 SEC No-Act
LEXIS 2335.
227. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-3 (2000). The SEC has stated that:
Rule 15c3-3 has two major components. First it provides a "formula" for the
determination of reserves. The Reserve Formula is designed to eliminate the
use of customers' funds and securities by broker-dealers in financing firm
overhead and such dealer activities as market-making, trading and
underwriting. Second, the rule codifies the obligation of broker-dealers to
establish procedures for insuring the prompt physical possession or control of
all fully-paid and excess margin securities carried for the account of customers.
SEC Study on the Financing and Regulatory Capital Needs of the Securities Industry,
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) No. 1109, at 7 (Jan. 23, 1985).
228. 15 U.S.C. § 78fff-3(a) (1994). See generally 15 U.S.C. § 78aaa-78/ll (1994)
(legislation creating SIPC to administer insurance scheme). See also Amendments to the
Securities Investor Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 96-433, sec. I, 94 Stat. 1855 (Oct. 10,
1980) (increasing insurance limits to $500,000).
229. Kathy M. Kristof, T+3 Rule: Living With Tighter Deadline 011 Trades, L.A.
TIMES, May 28, 1995, at D4. See also Herb Greenberg, From the Mailbag-More 011 the
Dangers of Buying IPOs, S.F. CHRON., May 6, 1995, at B 1 (noting that private coverage
may be up to $10 million for small accounts and $25 million for larger accounts); Herb
Greenberg, The Mailbag-Can You Be Sure Your Broker Isn't a Crook?, S.F. CHRON.,
Sept. 6, 1997, at DI (noting that private insurance may be canceled or may not cover a
particular risk and that an insurance company could itself become bankrupt).
230. Suitability rules are imposed by self-regulatory organizations such as the
NASD and the New York Stock Exchange, as well as the SEC. See 23A MARKHAM &
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dealers cannot recommend an investment for a retirement account that is
unsuitable for the investor in light of his or her particular investment
needs and objectives.231 Account executives must be supervised to
assure compliance with this requirement. 232 Restrictions are placed on
~n
the amount of markups that may be charged to customers,- · and
234
235
switching, churning, and other fraudulent practices are prohibited. 236
A third custodian for individual retirement programs is the insurance
industry. The sale of insurance in the United States, unlike other financial
service sectors, continues to be regulated principally by the states.2-·n
HAzEN, supra note 222, § 9.01. The SEC has special suitability rcquircmen~ for dealers
of penny stock Oow-priced speculative securities). 17 C.F.R. § 240.15g-9 (2000). The
weight of the authority is that there is no private right of action for suitability \'iolations,
but damages may be recovered where an unsuitable violation involves deception. See
23A MARKHAM & HAzEN, supra note 222, § 9.09.
231. See generally Lewis D. Lowenfels & Alan R. Bromberg, S11iwbiliry in
Securities Trcmsactions, 54 Bus. LAw. 1557 (1999) (describing suitability requirements).
Bank regulators adopted an "appropriateness" requirement, akin to the SEC suitability
rule, discussed supra note 230 and accompanying text, to protect institutions from
improper recommendations for derivative transactions by banks or their affiliates. See
Press Release, Comptroller of the Currency, OCC Releases Answers to Banker
Questions About Derivatives (May 10, 1994), 1994 OCC Enf. Dec. LEXIS 109 (citing
OCC Banking Circular No. 277 explaining the appropriateness requirement).
232. See generally 23A MARKHAM & HAzEN, supra note 222. §§ 7.9-.12
(describing SEC supervision requirements).
233. The SEC and the NASO prohibit broker-dealers from charging customers
excessive markups for securities sold from the broker-dealers own inventory. See 23A
MARKHAM & HAzEN, supra note 222, § 9.21 (describing marl..-up restrictions).
234. Switching involves moving customers from one mutual fund to another to
generate commissions. See, e.g., /11 re Krull, Exchange Act Release No. 3+40768, 68
S.E.C. Docket 2223 (Dec. 10, 1998), 1998 WL 849545 (upholding NASO disciplinary
action for switching).
235. Churning occurs where a broker controls a customer account and trades it in
order to generate commissions without regard to the customers needs and objectives.
See generally 23A MARKHAM & HAzEN, supra note 222, § 9.23 (describing churning).
236. See generally id. §§ 9.01-.29 (describing prohibited practices).
237. Following the decision of the Supreme Coun in United Stares \'. S.£.
Umienvriters Ass'11, 322 U.S. 533,553,560 (1944), which held that insurance involved
interstate commerce and was subject to the antitrust laws, Congress p:i.sscd the
McCarran-Ferguson Act, ch. 20, 59 StaL 33 (1945) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§
1011-15 (1994). That legislation immunized the insurance companies from the antitrust
laws to the extent their activities were regulated by state law. It did not, however,
preclude the application of the federal securities laws when insurance companies sell
securities instead of insurance products. SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 359
U.S. 65, 72 (1959); see bifra note 249 and accompanying text. After some fony large
insurance companies failed, Congress considered legislation in 1992 that would have
created a Federal Insurance Solvency Commission to establish national standards for the
financial soundness and solvency of insurance companies. That legislation was not
enacted. John L. Ingersoll et al., Federal Regulation of lns11ra11ce: The Jnd11s11y's
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The states have adopted elaborate regulatory structures to regulate this
business. 238 Those structures include licensing requirements to ensure
competency and integrity, restrictions on fraudulent sales practices,
underwriting requirements, and reserve and capital requirements. 239 The
National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) has sought to
create some uniformity in state insurance regulation through model laws,
but regulation remains uneven. 240 NAIC sought to further its testing of
the adequac~ of insurance company reserves by creating risk-based
capital tests. 41 On balance, the insurance industry has performed well
and customer losses have not reached any great magnitude. 242 A number
of class actions have been brought in recent years charging fraud in sales
practices of various insurance companies, many of which have been
settled. Insurance regulators are also becoming more aggressive in
attacking improper sales practices and thereby increasing customer
protection. 243
About sixty-five million workers were covered by retirement plans in
1995 that were maintained with life insurance companies. 244 Many
workers fund their retirements through annuities underwritten by
insurance companies. Unlike life insurance, which seeks to create an
estate upon the death of the insured, the annuity is designed to assure
Response to H.R. 4900 and H.R. 1290, 23 A.B.A. BRIEF 10-11 (Spring 1994); Scot J.
Paltrow, How Insurance Firms Beat Back an Effort for Stricter Controls, WALL ST. J.,
Feb 5, 1998, at I. See generally SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS OFTIIE
COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, 101ST CONG., FAILED PROMISES: INSURANCE
COMPANY INSOLVENCIES (Comm. Print 1990) [hereinafter FAILED PROMISES) (describing
insurance company failures).
238. The states have insurance guaranty funds, most of which try to protect life
policies to a limit of $300,000 in death benefits, $ I 00,000 in cash or withdrawal value,
$100,000 in the present value of annuity benefits and $ I 00,000 in health benefits. ALAN
GART, REGULATION, DEREGULATION, REREGULATION: THE FUTURE OF THE BANKING,
INSURANCE, AND SECURITIES INDUSTRIES 215 ( 1994 ).
239. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 58-1-1 to 58-88-30 ( 1999) (regulating insurance
company sales and operations).
240. NAIC created a joint reporting and surveillance system for large interstate
insurance companies. See D' ARISTA, supra note 98, at 304-05 (describing NAIC and its
activities). Most states do not require independent audits or reviews of actuaries in
setting reserves. International reinsurance issues are also often outside their jurisdiction.
FAILED PROMISES, supra note 237, at 63.
241. Before the introduction of risk-based capital requirements, most states imposed
reserve requirements and static minimum amounts of capital and surplus. Risk-based
capital standards changed this to require capital levels based on the risk of the
investments in an insurance company's portfolio. Larry G. Mayewski ct al., RBC:
Beauty Contest or Non-Event?, BEST'S REVIEW, Mar. 1994, at 33-34.
242. More than forty multistate insurance companies did fail in the early 1990s.
Broome & Markham, supra note 176, at 739. See generally FAILED PROMISES, supra
note 237 (discussing failures of large insurance companies).
243. See Broome & Markham, supra note 176, at 740 (providing a description of
sales practices cases involving insurance companies).
244. AM. COUNCIL OF LIFE INS., supra note 60, at 56.
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that the annuitant does not outlive his or her estate. Under the traditional
"fixed" annuity, the purchaser receives a fixed amount of income based
on his or her premium payments, life expectancy, and an assumed rate of
return on the premium payments. The insurance company has to bear
the risk that the purchasers will live longer than expected and that
returns on the investment of premiums may be less than projected. The
insurance company can model these risks based on mortality rates and
expected rates of return. This assures that the annuitant will have
income in the specified amount for the remainder of his or her life,
however long or short.245
The fixed annuity assures that the annuitant does not outlive his or her
income only if the insurance company remains solvent. ~.it. Another
concern is that because payments are fixed in amount, inflation can
undercut the value of the income received under a traditional annuity,
causing hardship to the annuitant. 247 Variable annuities were created to
deal with the inflation risk. This product was introduced in 1952 by the
College Retirement Equities Fund (CREF), which was affiliated with the
Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association (TIAA).2-18 Variable annuity
245. See generally Albert B. Crenshaw, The Baby Boomers' Heir-Cur: S111dy
Advises Generation Against Couming on /11herira11ce, WASH. POST, D.:c. I0, :woo, at H2
(describing annuities); Terry Savage, Don't 01·erlook Benejirs of Immediate :\111111ities,
CHI. SUN-TIMES, May 2, 1999, Financial Section, at 61, arailable at LEXIS, News
Group Ftle, All (same). In contrast. an endowment policy combines a savings feature
with a life insurance feature. At the end of the endowment period, the face amount of
the policy is paid to the beneficiary. TEMP. NAT'L ECON. CO~ll\l., 76ru Co:-G., supra
note 177, at 182.
246. A case in point was the failure of Baldwin United, a company that had i.old
pianos before becoming an underwriter of single premium deferred annuity contracl!. that
offered an attractive return as a guaranteed pay ouL The company was unable to meet
the investment performance required to meet that guarantee and defaulted. See
D'ArusTA, supra note 98, at 197-98, 316-17, 331 n.58 (describing the Bald,\in United
problems); Id. at 359, 370, 372 (describing lawsuits brought against distributors of the
product and state insurance guaranty funds and their inadequacies). Another company,
Charter Company, which sold single premium deferred annuities, also failed. BARRIE A.
WIGMORE, SECURITIES MARKErs IN l1tE 1980s: THE NEW REGIME, 1979-1984, at 53-54
(1997) (describing Baldwin United and Charter failures). Another debacle for the
insurance industry was the guaranteed investment contract (GIC) that assured a spc.:ific
return from investments in a retirement plan. Insurance companies offering thii. product
underestimated the risks and Jost money when they had to meet this guarantee. JOH."1
Rous~1ANIERE, THE LIFE AND TIMES OF ruE EQUITABLE 263-302 (19951 (giving an
overview of GICs); Michael Quint. Aellla life to Cm 4000 Jobs a11d Take S/.3 Billion
Charge, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 1994, at 35 (describing losses from GJCs and i,ingle
payment annuities).
247. DOWNES & GoODMAN, supra note 114, at 9-10.
248. CEDRIC V. FRICKE, THE VARIABLE ANNum·: ITS IMPACT o:-: THE SAVINGS-

793

premiums are invested in securities and the performance of those
investments determine the amount of the income from the variable
annuity, rather than the assumed interest rate that is used for the fixed
annuity. The purchaser of a variable annuity bears the risk that
investment returns will be less than expected. Returns may also be
higher than those of a fixed annuity if the investment of the variable
annuity premiums exceeds the rates assumed for the return on the fixed
annuity.
The creation of the variable annuity represented an effort by the
insurance industry to take advantage of investor interest in the stock
market, which was rising during the 1950s. The insurance industry
wanted a product to compete with mutual funds, and the variable annuity
filled that role. The variable annuity, however, was held to be a securit(9
by the Supreme Court in SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Insurance Co.2' 9
This meant that variable annuities were subject to regulation by the SEC
under the federal securities laws, and investors were given the
protections those laws afford. 250 The product was in all events a popular
one. By 1995, about 12.8 million individuals had variable annuity plans,
mostly deferred annuities. 251 The nature of variable annuity programs
varied widely. In 1998, over 100 insurance companies were offering

INVESTMENT MARKET 2 ( 1959). These contracts were only available to teachers, but the
Participating Annuity Life Insurance Company offered variable annuity contracts to the
general public in 1954. AM. COUNCIL OF LIFE INS., supra note 60, at 132.
249. 359 U.S. 65 (1959). See generally SEC v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 387
U.S. 202 (1967) (holding again that variable annuities were securities subject to
regulation by the SEC).
250. SEC regulation meant, among other things, that insurance companies selling
variable annuities and other insurance products that had an investment component were
required to establish "separate" accounts to hold their reserves for these products. See
Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. SEC, 326 F.2d 383, 388 (3d Cir. 1964) (holding that the
separate accounts for a variable annuity contract were a separate legal entity from the
insurance company, which meant those accounts would be regulated as investment
companies). The SEC granted relief to allow the insurance companies to avoid most of
the effects of this regulation. Lawrence J. Latto, Federal Regulation of the Contracts
Issued by Life Insurance Companies, in THE FINANCIAL SERVICES REVOLUTION:
UNDERSTANDING THE CHANGING ROLE OF BANKS, MUTUAL FUNDS, AND INSURANCE
COMPANIES 29, 39 (Clifford E. Kirsch, ed. 1997). The SEC did set forth requirements
that insurance companies had to meet in order to sell securities to retail customers.
Chubb Sec. Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, [1993-1994 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 'lI 76,829 (Nov. 24, 1994).
251. AM. COUNCIL OF LIFE INS., supra note 60, at 38. The assets held in those
separate accounts were in excess of $400 billion by 1995. Id. at 7. This was an increase
of over 30% from 1994. Id. Common stock constituted over 60% of those assets. lei.
The appeal of variable annuities was hurt by changes in the tax laws that reduced capital
gains taxes for competing investments. Rick Bloom, Variable Annuities Short-Change
Buyers, DETROIT NEWS, May 21, 2000, at 3B; see also The Motley Fool: The Fool
School-On Variable Annuities, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Oct. 16, 2000, at 4D
(discussing the disadvantages of variable annuities).
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some 260 different variable annuity products.251
Barring an unforeseen catastrophe, banks, broker-dealers and insurance
companies all seem to be appropriate depositories for private social
security accounts. The difficulty lies with their differing regulatory
structures, particularly the insurance features available for private retirement
accounts placed with one or the other of those entities. Obviously, the
government cannot insure these accounts against investment losses, and
insurance coverage that is too broad or unregulated will only encourage
the repeat of a debacle such as that experienced with the savings and
loan associations in the 1980s.253 Nevertheless, more uniformity is
needed to reduce consumer confusion and disparity of coverage.2.."" This
will be a difficult task. Currently various insurance regulators (FDIC,
SIPC, PGBC and state insurance commissions) cover redundant different
types of products. For example, FDIC insurance covers bank products,
while SIPC covers only losses from broker-dealer insolvency.

VIII. INVESTMENT REsTRICTIONS
A significant issue in privatization of Social Security is whether
restrictions should be placed on the type or nature of the investments
placed in such accounts. The concern is that an investor will bet the
ranch on a risky investment. If the government steps in to protect such
persons when they inevitably encounter disaster, the situation becomes a
"heads, I win; tails, you lose" proposition. That is, if the investor is luch.-y
on the investment, he becomes rich. If not, the government steps in to
protect the investor from his own folly. Without market discipline and
the hardships associated with that discipline, investors are encouraged to
incur inordinate risks. Nevertheless, society will be reluctant to turn its
back even on gamblers who lost it all on the red nine in Las Vegas.
252. Deborah Lohse, Shelf Space Gets Scarce for Am111ities, WALL ST. J., Aug. 17,
1998, at Cl. These investments are not free from fraud. Investors have been subject to
improper recommendations urging them to switch from one variable annuity to another
in order to generate commissions for their broker. Jeff D. Opdyke, Shifti11g 1111111,ities
May Help Brokers More Tha11 /m•estors, WALL ST. J., Feb. 16, 2001, at Cl.
253. See supra note 221 and accompanying text.
254. A former SEC commissioner has expressed concern that privatil.ing Social
Security will result in a demand for more regulation. See ge11erally Robena S. Kannel,
The Challenge to Fi11m1cial Regulators Posed by Social Security Primtiwtion, 64
BROOK. L. REv. 1043 (1998) (discussing SEC regulatory issues that would ari~ upon
the privatization of Social Security). This would tum back ongoing effons to cut back
on regulation in order to make the securities markets more ellicient antJ competitive.
Uniformity in other areas of regulation is also needed.
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To guard against undue investment risks, the Department of Labor
under ERISA has set investment standards for trustees handling and
investing pension funds. That standard has a long history that has relevance
to investment of private social security accounts. Early English court
decisions had allowed trustees to invest trust funds in real estate and
joint-stock companies, including those of the East India Company. 255
Trustees could not lend on the credit of individuals, no matter how
"unimpeachable their credit."256 The South Sea Bubble changed the
attitude of the English courts, and trustees found themselves bound by
legal requirements that restricted their investments mostly to government
securities. 257 In America, the decision of the Massachusetts court in
1830 in Harvard College v. Amory258 imposed the "prudent man" rule on
trustee investments. The court held that in making trust investments
trustees must use "sound discretion" and must act in the same manner as
"men of prudence, discretion, and intelligence manage their own affairs,
not in regard to speculation, but in regard to the permanent disposition of
their funds, considering the probable income, as well as the probable
safety of the capital to be invested."259 The courts in America split on
whether this rule would allow investments in common stock. 260 Later,
states adopted legislation that created "legal lists" that specified what
securities were prudent investments for trustees. Initially, those lists did
not include common stocks. 261
State law changed after World War II permitted trustees to purchase
stocks. Colorado, for example, amended its constitution in 1950 to
allow trust funds to be invested in common stocks and corporate
bonds. 262 Twenty-two states enacted the Model Prudent Man Investment
Act in 1963 that eased restrictions on fiduciary investments. Gradually,
these state statutes and court decisions allowed fiduciaries to invest
255. See generally Ellen L. Nylund, Investments by Trustees, 20 Crn.-KENT L. Rev.
331-32 (1942) (discussing English chancery decisions allowing investments in stocks).
256. Jerry W. Markham, Fiduciary Duties Under the Commodity Excha11ge Act, 68
NOTRE DAME L. Rev. 199, 212 (1992) (citing Practical Summary of the Law of Trustees,
27 LAW TIMES 170 (Mar. 29, 1856).
257. See Stephen M. Dickson, Note, Trust Administratio11 in Georgia a11d the
Prudent Investor Rule: May Trustees Delegate Their Investment Powers?, 14 GA. ST. U.
L. Rev. 633, 637-38 (I 998) (discussing the collapse of the South Sea bubble on the
powers of trustees).
258. 26 Mass. (9 Pick.) 446 (1830).
259. Id. at 462.
260. See Ernest G. Strand, New York's Partial Prudent-Man-Rule, 25 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 583 (1950).
261. Gustav B. Margraf, Laws Relating to the Investment of Trust Fu11ds, /930-1937, 5 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 399 (1938); William R. White and Irving A.J. Lawres,
The Modernization of Legal Lists, 5 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 386 (1938).
262. Charles A. Baer, The "Prudent-Man Rule" Now Applies to lnvestme11ts by
Fiduciaries, 28 DICTA 213 (1951).
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greater amounts into corporate stocks. 26:i Also, the courts restricted
fiduciaries from commingling funds of trust estates for investment
purposes, which prevented trustees from managing funds on a large-scale
basis. Court decisions and various statutes later relaxed those restrictions.2M
BRISA adopted a prudent man standard requiring investments to be
made with ''the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances
then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like capacity and farniliar
with such matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like
character and with like aims."265 Later, a more sophisticated standard
for trustee investments gradually shunted the legal list and prudent man
restrictions aside. Something called "modem portfolio theory" sought to
diversify investments across a wide spectrum. This theory was based on
a belief that price changes in an "efficient" stock or other market are
dependent on the introduction of new information. 266 This means that
stock prices are as predictable as a "random walk" down Wall Street267
and that even the best f:ortfolio manager cannot out-guess the market
over a sustained period.2 8 Therefore, under modem portfolio theory, the
portfolio manager should diversify investments across the market, which

263. Meigs, supra note 107, at 371 n.9 (1965).
264. CHAIRMAN OF TIIB S.E.C., INVESTMENT TRUSTS AND INVESTMENT Cm.tPA,-.:1Es,
H.R Doc. No. 76-476, at 5 (1939). Banking regulations require banks to invest
fiduciary funds in a manner "consistent with applicable Jaw." 12 C.F.R. § 9.11 (2001).
This requirement has been interpreted liberally. RAYMO!\'D W. Go!DS~IITH. INsTmrno:-...\L
lNvEsTORS AND CORPORATE STOCK-A BACKGROUND SroDY 70 ( 1973 ).
265. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(l)(B) (1994).
266. For a discussion of efficient market theory see Central Nat'/ Bank of Malloon
v. United States Dep't of Treasury, 912 F.2d 897, 901-02 (7th Cir. 1990). Critics have
contended that such things as "noise" trading by uninfom1ed investors and something
called the "efficiency paradox" preelude the existence of a truly efficient market. Joa
SELIGMAN, CORPORATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS 256-57 l 1995).
267. BURTON G. MAI.KIEL, A RANDOM \VALK DOWN \VAU. STREET 24 ( 1999).
268. ROGER 1.oWENSTEtN, BUFFETI: THE MAKING OF AN A\IERICAN CAPITALIST 307
(1995). One senator tried to prove this point by throwing darts to select stocks for a
portfolio. His selections did better than those chosen by the average mutual fund. Joa
SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WAU. STREET: A HISTORY OFlHE SECURITIES AND
ExCHANGE COMMISSION AND MODERN CORPORATE FINANCE 365-66 ( 1982). One study
evidenced that mutual fund investors would have been better off in a fund that simply
mimicked the stocks listed on the New York Stock Exchange. rather than placing
themselves in the hands of a portfolio manager that sought to do better than the market.
Adam Bryant, Je(JJz Crockett, 79, First Woman to Lead the Philadelpl1it1 Fed, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 7, 1998, at C23; see also Jonathan Clements, Resisting the fore of Managed
Funds, WAIL ST. J., Feb. 27, 2001, at Cl (concluding that over a thirty-six year period,
investors in actively managed mutual funds would have received a higher return from
passively managed indexed funds).
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will allow the portfolio to at least match market performance since it
cannot outperform it. Modem portfolio theory encourages passive
investment in which a portfolio is diversified to track some stock market
index that broadly reflects over-all market movements. 269 Modern
portfolio theory allows the introduction of risk into the portfolio as a part
of diversification. 270 This permits even speculative investments as a
portion of the portfolio.
Modem portfolio theory has gained wide acceptance. The Department
of Labor was among those adopting prudential investment standards for
pension fund managers that allowed implementation of modem portfolio
theory. 271 Investments of the portfolio manager would be viewed in the
context of the overall portfolio and not just on whether a particular
investment was a risky one. 272 Modem portfolio theory avoids
concentration of risks into the portfolio. Consequently, a single failure
or even a drop in a sector of the economy will not destroy the value of
the portfolio. Diversification also envisions capturing profits from
various sectors as they outperform others. An overall economic drop
may affect the portfolio adversely, but this would generally reflect an
overall disinflation that would be captured in a diversified investment
strategy. 273
269. See generally Dolores Kong, What's Best Financial Advice You've Received?,
BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 5, 2000, at H6, available at http://secure.boston.com/bg_archives/
newarch.cgi (last visited June 3, 2001) (describing advantages of passive investing); Phil
Porter, Savers Should Switch to Safer Passive Investments, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, May
31, 1992, at lG, available at LEXIS, News Group File, All (describing modem portfolio
theory and passive investing); Liz Pulliam Weston, Pros, Cons of Top 40I(k) Advice
Web Sites, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2000, at C4 (describing modem portfolio theory and
diversification).
270. Modem portfolio theory includes the concept of:
[C]ovariance ... which is intended to provide a constant overall return on investment
under divergent circumstances. Some investments are made in anticipation of
specific circumstances; others are made in anticipation of contrary
circumstances.
An over-simplified example is a portfolio including
investments in umbrellas as well as sunscreen in anticipation of rainy as well
as sunny weather.
In re Piper Capital Mgmt., Inc., Admin. Proceeding File No. 3-9657 (Nov. 30. 2000),
2000 SEC LEXIS 2626.
271. See Laborers Nat') Pension Fund v. Northern Trust Quantitative Advisors, Inc.,
173 F.3d 313, 317 (5th Cir. 1999) (describing Department of Labor regulations that
adopt the modem portfolio theory, 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404a-lb(b)(l)(i)-(ii) (2000), cert.
denied, 528 U.S. 967 (2000).
272. LoWENSTEIN, supra note 268, at 319; see also Rona Kobell, Executive in the

Spotlight: Robert Wolf, an Estate Lawyer Who Thinks Like a Money Manager,
PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Oct. 31, 1999, at C5, available at http://www.postgazette.com/businessnews/19991031 exec4.asp (stating that modem portfolio theory
allows trustees to look at total return rather than the performance of each security in the
portfolio) (last visited June 3, 200 I).
273. The 1970s, however, were marked by a period of "stagflation" in which
unemployment and inflation rose while the stock market dropped. Jim Gallagher,
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BRISA thus has in place fairly sophisticated standards for defined
benefit plans, but that protection does not extend to private IRAs. This
raises the issue of what standard should be applied to the individually
managed accounts of individuals who may not have access or choose not
to use professional investment managers. Presently, Keogh and other
IRAs permit such self-management with few restrictions, and selfdirected accounts may not always be prudentially managed. An
individual may fancy himself a stock picker who can out-guess the
market What is to become of that individual when he learns that a
random walk down Wall Street or the use of darts would have been more
profitable?274 What about the investor who invested heavily in Internet
stocks in the last market bubble, only to see them drop to less than onehalf of their purchase price?275 If a private social security account were
the only retirement source for this individual, what responsibility does
society have to protect him from himself or to rescue him after his poor
judgment renders him impecunious.
Where, Oh Where, ls Big, Bad Bear?, ST. LoUJS POST-DISPATCH, July 28, 1997.
Business Plus, at 7, ai-ailable at LEXIS, News Group File. All; Eight l'et1rs .4nd
Counting, USA TODAY, Apr. 1, 1999, at 14A. Of course, this might suggest even
broader diversification into such things as bullion and an that increase in value during
inflationary periods. See generally, Tom Petruno, Imemer Stocks: The M"nia Thar
Wouldn't Die?, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 28, 1999, at Cl (describing the run-up in gold prices in
1979-1980 when prices increased from $232 to over $800 per ounce and then back dO\o,n
to $320 in 1982 as inflation abated). Cf. James Grant, When Money Becomes 11
Confidence Trick: The Flipside of /m•estors' Persistem lack of /merest in Gold is an
Unquestioning Faith in Money, FINANCIAL TL1\tES (London), July 10, 2000, at 19,
available at http://globalarchive.ft.com/globalarchivc/articles.html'?print=true&id=0007
10001656 (describing falling gold prices and the decreased dependence on gold rl!Serves
by central banks) (last visited June 4, 2001).
274. Market timing investment strategies also face risks. One analyst note; that
even an investor with perfect timing techniques will fare less well than an investor with a
steady program of long term investment that can grow through accretion of investment
returns, rather than market timing. The Most lmponam ln\'estillg Principle of All •..
$954,680, supra note 153, at 3. New York has a College Savings Program that provides
tax-advantaged investments for college expenses. Under that program, more ri:.ky
investments are used in the early years of saving in order lo build up the account of
younger parents. Thereafter, less risk.")' investments are used lo preserve the capital in the
account for college expenses. The program resulted in losses of one-third of the amounts
held in those programs for riskier investments when the market plunged. Jay Gallagher,
N.Y. College-Savings Fwui Dii-es: Tumbling Stock Marker Means Thousands Lost Third
ofInvestment, R0CHESlER DEMOCRAT & CHRON., May 21, 200 I, at I B.
275. See generally Greg Ip, A Year of Lfring Da11gero1tsly, WALL ST. J., Jan. 2.
2001, at Rl (stating that the 54% "peak-to-trough" drop in the Nasdaq market saw a drop
in values of $3.3 trillion, which is equal to about one third of the value of all homes in
America).
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Presently, IRAs can be invested in almost every kind of instrument
including stocks, bonds, mutual funds, certificates of deposit, annuities
and precious metals. However, "[p]hysical real estate cannot be among
an IRA's assets." 276 A wide range of investments is also permitted for
Keogh accounts, except precious metals and collectibles are excluded. 277
IRA account holders have also been fairly active traders with an average
annual turnover ratio of 67 .6% between 1991 and 1996. On average, a
little over two-thirds of the assets in private retirement accounts were
bought and sold in a single year. Individual investors were even more
active in nonretirement accounts, with 89% in annual turnover during
that period. 278 These turnover figures seem quite high in view of the fact
that the classic strategy for the individual investor is to buy and hold. 279
That strategy is driven by the fact that individual investors have cost,
time, place, and informational disadvantages that seriously handicap
them in any aggressive and active trading program. 280 The cost
disadvantage is due to the fact that individual investors do not own
exchange memberships or have institutional bargaining power that
allows them to trade cheaply. Each transaction results in a commission
charge that must be recovered before a profit is made. This will require
an increase in value of the investment that will generally require some
period of time. Even then, the commission charge may cut the percentage
of return substantially unless amortized over a long period. 281
Time, place, and informational advantages are also ceded to the
professional trader because the trader can operate on the trading floor or
have access to information that has market effect more readily than a
276. DOWNES & GOODMAN, supra note 114, at 374.
277. Id. at 399.
278. David Robinson, Retirement Accounts Aren't for Frenetic Trading, BUFFALO
NEWS, Mar. 19, 2000, at 814, available at 2000 WL 5671340.
279. See generally Roger Thornham, Survey Online Investing: In Search of cm
Education-If Brokers Want Online, INVESTORS CHRON., Jan. 19, 200 I, at I07, available
at 2001 WL 7013638 (discussing buy and hold strategy). Cf Gregory Zuckerman &
Ianthe Jeanne Dugan, Folks Who Like to Buy a Stock and Forget It Face Rude
Awakening, WALL ST. J., Feb. 7, 2001, at Al (discussing the dangers of buy and hold
strategies for small investors).
280. See generally Bill Brashier, Taking Stock of £-trading, CHI. TRIB., May 7,
2000, Mag., at IO (describing traditional market advantages of professional traders),
available at 2000 WL 3663305.
281. Courts have traditionally considered an annual turnover ratio of six (i.e., the
assets in the accounts are sold six times within a year) to be fraudulent when a
customer's account is controlled by a broker-dealer because such high volume trading
indicates that the account is being traded to generate commissions, rather than for the
long-term interests of the customer. See generally Note, Churning by Securities Dealers,
80 HARV. L. REV. 869 (1967) (describing the phenomenon of churning); Mihara v. Denn
Witter & Co., 619 F.2d 814, 824-25 (9th Cir. 1980) (same). Higher ratios may be
justified where a customer has an aggressive trading strategy. Newberger, Loeb & Co. v.
Gross, 563 F.2d 1057, 1070 (2d Cir. 1977).
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small investor. The exchange specialist, for example, has greater access
to order flow and other information than a small investor. 282 The
individual seeking short-term profits is thus severely handicapped in
trading against more informed and nimble institutional competitors.
The Internet and discount brokers are removing some of the
advantages enjoyed by institutional investors. Even small traders may
obtain reduced commissions if they forsake advice and information that
is provided by the "full-service" broker-dealer. 283 The Internet is also
helping to lessen the time and place advantages of professional traders
and is equalizing information flows among all classes of investors.
Online trading provides individual investors with quicker and cheaper
access to the market.284 Some individual investors used that advantage
to engage in "day trading," that is, rapid in-and-out trades that seek
quick profits. This professional style of trading became popular in the
market run up at the end of the last century. Unfortunately, the results
were not all that great, even disastrous for many.28.~ Other innovations
include Internet connections that allow investors to create their own
stock funds customized for their particular goals or trading objectives.:?S6
Notwithstanding concerns with the investment strategies of the
individual investor, there have been no great scandals in which massive
numbers of IRA account holders were left destitute by bad investment
choices.287 Surely, there have been losses that have been masked by
282.

See generally ECNs Ask: Why Don't Excha11ges Keep Pace?, SECURJTIES

INDUSTRY ONLINE, Apr. 17, 2000, at http://www.securitiesundustry.com/issue.cfm?id=
153&aid=5538 (last visited June 3, 2001) {cliscussing traditional time, place, and informational

advantages of the exchange specialist).
283. See generally Arthur M. Louis, Coming to Cliems' Rescue, S.F. Cl!ROS., May
9, 2000, at D1 (describing traditional roles of discount broker and full service finr.s and
how their distinctions are now blurring).
284. Some 10.5 million accounts were trading online by mid-1999. Richard J.
Hillman, On-Line Trading; Better lm·estor Protection lllfomwtion Needed 011 Brokers
Web Sites, GAO REPs., May 9, 2000, at 1, a1·ailable at LEXIS, News Group File, All.
285. Various studies found that day traders tended to lose rather than make money.
See Rebecca Buckman, Report 011 Day-Trading Fin11's Accou111s Finds Netzrly ThreeQuarters in tlze Red, WALL ST. J., Aug. 9, 1999, at CJS; Gretchen Morgenson, Day
Trades: Big Growth, Big Risks, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 1999, at A9; Michael Schro\!der,
Day-Trading Fimis Rebuked by Group of Stare Regulators O1·er Marketing, W,\l.LST. J.,
Aug. 10, 1999, at A26; Ruth Simon, Se11are Heaps Nell' Grie1·a11ces 011 Day-Trt1di11g
Finns, WALL ST. J., Feb. 24, 2000, at Cl.
286. Patrick McGeehan & Danny Hakim, Tll'o Fund Giallls to /111rotl11ce SelfDirected Portfolios for Investors, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2001, al Cl.
287. Market downturns will inevitably take a toll on retirement accounts. Section
401(k) accounts experienced an average loss of $4821 during the market downturn in
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Social Security, which provides a backstop for those using bad judgment in
their investment choices. Such insurance will be lost if Social Security
is completely privatized, and the dangers of poor individual investment
choices will become more apparent.
Still another concern is investment fraud. Retirees and unsophisticated
investors are prime targets for securities fraud. 288 They will also be
tempted to take larger investment risks if a period of inflation reduces
the purchasing power of their low-risk portfolios. These dangers are all
real, but the present system of private pension fund accounts and
individual investment holding is a far cry from the situation that gave
rise to Social Security in the 1930s. Americans are becoming more
experienced investors, they have overall handled their investments
wisely, and the federal securities laws provide protection from widespread
fraudulent activities. 289 There is also a vast regulatory and administrative
infrastructure now in place for handling and protecting private retirement
accounts. 290 The SEC is already stepping up investor education efforts
as more pension plans become self-directed. 291
It is, nevertheless, tempting to propose investment restrictions on
private social security accounts. Society has an interest in protecting
itself from destitute victims, even when that circumstance is due to their
own folly. But the adoption of new "legal" lists for approved investments
can hardly be justified in light of their abandonment as a standard for
professional trustees. Those lists were simply too restrictive for changing
economic conditions and investment theory. Any effort to specify appropriate
investments will encounter those same problems. The adoption of
modem portfolio theory and passive investing standards may be a more
flexible approach. 292 Yet, who is to say what investments meet those
2000 and more losses were expected. House Bill Raises IRA, 40/(k) limits, NEWS &
OBSERVER (Raleigh, NC), May 3, 2001, at DI, available at 2001 WL 3463363; see also
New York Governments May Have to Contribute to Employees' Pensions, WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 27, 2001, at A4 (noting that a state pension fund lost $6 billion in value due to
market drop). Under modern portfolio theory, however, such losses are expected, as arc
market recoveries. Over the long run the market should return a higher amount than
other investments. Supra notes 266-73 and accompanying text. Of course we should
remember it was not until 1954 that the stock market recovered to the level that it had
peaked at in 1929. SOBEL, supra note 68, at 225.
288. See generally Evan Perez, Drive ls Launched on Investment Fraud Targeting
Florida's Retirees, Foreigners, WALL ST. J., Jan. 12, 2001, at Cl6 (describing formation
of a federal task force to combat telemarketing and Internet fraud schemes directed at the
elderly).
289. See THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 1.2 (3d ed.
1996) (describing federal securities laws that were enacted in the wake of the Stock
Market Crash of 1929).
290. See supra notes 204-43 and accompanying text.
291. See generally Roye, supra note 1.
292. By 1986, over $100 billion was being passively invested. LOWENSTEIN, supra
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standards?293 Is it a portfolio indexed to the Dow Jones Industrial
Average, the S&P 500 or the Russell 2000 index of smaller companies'?
Even if all of those indexes are selected, how will di versification into the
bond market be handled?294 Most analysts will not recommend I 00%
stock market exposure. 295 Assuming that a properly diversified bond
index is also incorporated, what about real estate and commodity
exposure to assure a truly diversified portfolio'? Can an unsophisticated
investor deal with the complexities required to maintain a diversified
portfolio?
There are a number of ways to deal with these concerns and there
already appear to be several private solutions to the dilemma of
investment choices, including a broad range of diversified mutual funds.
We must also not forget the need for life and disability insurance for the
account holders. Numerous forms of insurance and annuity programs
are available that could be used to meet the concern of inadequate
savings or poor investments. For example, term insurance can be adjusted
to meet changing needs.296 In addition, "whole life" or "ordinary" life
insurance is a traditional approach to life insurance and estate building.

note 268, at 319.
293. Asset allocation, which involves the shifting of invcslment funds among stock.
bonds and other investments as market conditions change, is a popular in,·estmcnt
technique. Id. at 303. Dynamic hedging and program trading arc other popular trading
methodologies. They rely on computer technology and sophisticated database analysis
for portfolio adjustments. Such methodologies were blamed for accentuating the market
plunge during the stock market crash in October 1987. See ge11eral/y Jerry W. Markham
& Rita McCioy Stephanz, The Stock Market Crash of 1987-The U11ired Stares looks tlt
New Recommemlatio11S, 16 GEO. L.J. 1993 {1988) (describing these trading techniques
and their role in the October 1987 market crisis).
294. Even if bonds are added to the portfolio, diversification of counter party risk is
needed unless investment is limited to U.S. government bonds (a shrinking market as the
national debt is paid off), housing agency securities such as those issued by GNMA. and
government insured products such as certificate of deposits. Further, bond in\'csting can
be a complicated matter unless the instrument is held to maturity, which may be
undesirable in a changing market Those trading bonds must consider such things as
"duration" risk. i.e, the price reaction of a particular fixed income instrument to changes
in the yield curve. The "convexity" of a particular instrument's duration will measure its
sensitivity to interest rate changes. In re Piper Capital Mgmt, Inc., supra note 270, at 24
nn.13-14.
295. Modeling even a diversified portfolio for predicted returns is still an unccnain
business at best See Jonathan Clements, Reriremem Models Thar Let Reality Bite,
WAU. ST. J.• Feb. 20, 2001, at Cl (stating that "deterministic" retirement models are
unrealistic because they rely on a presumed rate of return and "probabilistic" models are
needed to assess chances of success for a particular strategy).
296. See supra notes 184-85 and accompanying text
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This policy combines a saving feature with life insurance through level
premium payments. The premium reflects both a savings program and a
mortality feature. The premium for these policies in earlier years will be
more than term insurance because the insured is building up savings that
will provide a return and offset higher mortality charges in later years.
The savings value built up in the policy has a loan value and can be used
to pay premiums, again as a loan, where the insured is unemployed for a
time and unable to make payments. In 1996, there was $7 trillion of
ordinary life insurance in effect. 297 Whole life policies constituted about
two-thirds of the life insurance policies written in 1997.298 These
policies have, however, traditionally been poor investments in that they
have had a low rate of assumed return and do not account for inflation.
A number of other insurance products are available that provide
savings features, as well as cover mortality risk. For example, "universal"
insurance products provide more flexibility than is available under
traditional whole life policies. These policies unbundle the life insurance
mortality costs and the interest credited on policy values and expense
charges. 299 This allows the policyholder to vary the amount or timing of
premium payments. 300 Some of these policies have a level death benefit
and others have a variable death benefit, depending on the level of
payments being made. If premiums are not paid, the cash value of the
policy can be used to meet minimum premium requirements. 301
Universal life insurance became a popular product and was accounting
for 38% of the industry's premiums by 1985, up from 2% in 1981. 302
"Variable" insurance is a product that offers even greater flexibility.
These policies allow the policyholders to invest premiums in investments
that provide an opportunity for a greater return than available from
traditional whole life insurance. Coverage from such products increased
from about $6.8 billion in 1985 to $83.6 billion in 1995. 303 Flexible
premium variable or universal variable life insurance had the features of
universal life insurance and had death benefits that would vary according
to investment performance of assets under the contract. 304 Variable
products would have to be given tax-advantaged treatment for premiums
297. AM. COUNCIL OF LIFE INS., supra note 60, at 5.
298. Karine Michael, Selling Security: Companies Drop Premium Rates 011 Term
Life lllsurance, HERALD-SUN (Durham, NC), Jan. I 0, 1999, at Fl.
299. GARY SCHULTE, THE FALL OF FIRST EXECUTIVE: THE HOUSE THAT FRED CARR
BUILT 46 (1991).
300. AM. COUNCIL OF LIFE INS., supra note 60, at 27.
301. Latto, supra note 250, at 50.
302. Irwin W. Goldberg, What's Hot a11d What's Not, BEST'S REVIEW, Feb. 1987, at
24.
303. AM. COUNCIL OF LIFE INS., supra note 60, at I 0.
304. Id. at 27.
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in order to make them viable for retirement planning. More importantly,
life insurance seeks to create an estate upon the death of the insured,
rather than assure that the insured will not outlive the assets in their
estate. The latter is the concern of a pension, but another insurance
product, the annuity, is also directed toward meeting that problem.
Fixed annuity contracts raise concerns with inflation; their level
benefits may be undercut in purchasing price by inflation. Variable
annuity contracts are an investment mechanism that can be used to
provide a lifetime stream of income that will reflect the benefits of
investment returns. The annuity can be combined with a mortality
feature and disability insurance. In some instances, variable annuities
provide for fixed periodic payments once the accumulation stage ends
(the period when contributions are made) and the annuitization stage
begins (the period of retirement). Other variable annuities make
payments based on accumulated investments and their current value at
the time each payment is made. Some annuities may provide a
combination of both fixed and variable payments and may have a
mortality feature that provides for a return of the accumulated funds in
the event of death before predicted life expectancy. 30~
A product of some interest is the so-called "Retirement CD," which
was being sold by the Blackfeet National Bank under a license from the
American Deposit Corporation in Pine, Colorado.306 This tax-advantaged
product required the customer to make an initial deposit with the bank,
and the customer selected a maturity date, presumably the date of his or
her retirement.307 The interest rate was fixed for a period of one to five
years, as selected by the customer. Thereafter, and until maturity,
interest rates for investment return fluctuated with the market but were
not allowed to drop below 3%. Upon maturity, holders of the retirement
CD were allowed to withdraw a portion of the funds (up to two-thirds
including accrued interest), but the rest were paid out on a fixed annuity
basis for the rest of their lives, even if the account balance was below
zero.308 If a holder died before the account reached zero, the balance
remaining in the account was paid to his or her estate in a lump sum.
The amount of the payments made to customers during the annuitization

305.
306.
307.
308.

Id. at 38.
See Am. Deposit Corp. v. Schacht, 84 F.3d 834, 836 {7 th Cir. 1996).
Id.
Id.
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phase of this product was based on mortality tables. 309
This product, while not perfectly fitted for a private social security
account, demonstrates the imaginative way in which private accounts
can be structured. Thre Retirement CD also combined tax-advantaged
accumulation with a FDIC guarantee of the deposit up to permissible
limits. Unfortunately, state insurance regulators were allowed to impede
the sale of these instruments. Federal banking regulators had approved
this product for sale by banks, but the courts held that it was actually
insurance and not a bank product whose regulation would be preempted by
federal regulations. 310 The product was also later denied deferred tax
advantages by the Internal Revenue Service. 311 Nevertheless, if preempted
and tax-advantaged, this type of product could be used to provide some
degree of safety of principal to the owner of a private social security
account, while allowing accumulation at market interest rates. The banks
have also offered CDs with returns that are based on market returns of
an index of stocks, allowing market participation with a guaranteed floor
feature. 312 The federal government's inflation indexed bonds are another
example of how instruments have developed to deal with the risk that
retirees fixed payments are undercut by inflation. 313
IX. GOVERNMENT MANAGED PRIVATE ACCOUNTS

A number of instruments are available to provide flexible means for
mortality, disability, inflation, and other investment risks. The only
issue is whether the government should mandate one or the other. The
answer is probably not. This would stifle innovation and would
undoubtedly interfere with investment performance. On balance, the
309. Id.
310. Blackfeet Nat'! Bank v. Nelson, I 7 I F.3d I 237, 1247 (I Ith Cir. 1999); Am.
Deposit Corp., 84 F.3d at 841--42.
311. Legislation was also introduced in Congress to deny them FDIC insurance.
Press Release, Comptroller of the Currency, Remarks by Eugene A. Ludwig Comptroller
of the Currency Before the American Bankers Association Annual Convention
Honolulu, Hawaii (Oct. 5 1996), LEXIS Banking Bulletin.
312. See generally Inv. Co. Inst. v. Ludwig, 884 F. Supp. 4-5 (D.D.C. 1995) (describing
indexed certificate of deposit). Another product attacked by regulators was the "callable
CD," which was criticized because of its long-term maturity, which made it illiquid. The
call feature also gave the issuer an advantage in the event of rising interest rates.
Edward Jones Fined $200,000 by NYSE in Callable-CDs Case, WALL ST. J., Dec. 21,
2000, at B 11.
313. See generally Jonathan Clements, Need a Lift? Inflation Bonds Are Handy,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 12, 2000, at Cl (describing inflation bonds as increasing principal by
rate of principal plus additional interest on the increased sum). In July 2000, these
government "I" bonds were paying a base rate of 3.6% plus a semi-annual amount based
on the rate of inflation as determined by the Consumer Price Index. The "I'' bond was
then providing a total return of 7.49%. Terry Savage, Savings Bonds Offer Peace of
Mind, CHI. SUN-TIMES, July 6, 2000, at 50.
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millions of consumers directly affected by their investments are in a
better position to decide the nature of their retirement programs.
Mistakes will be made, but hopefully they will be isolated, and not
systemic, as are the flaws built into the Social Security system. Nevertheless,
there will be efforts made to keep even private market investments under
government control.314 President Clinton proposed in his State of the
Union Address in 1999 that the government invest in the stock market
on behalf of Social Security programs in order to boost benefits.
Clinton's proposal would, however, have kept those investment decisions
out of the hands of individuals; he was concerned that people would lose
their mone; in the market or become victims of fraudulent investment
schemes.31 This "nanny" state proposal was a nonstarter. Critics raised
concerns that the government would be put in a position to socialize
business in America, or to at least tty to control the activities of
corporations for noneconomic reasons. Clinton abandoned this effort as a
result of that opposition.316
Nevertheless, suggestions have been made that private investments
could be made in Social Security accounts without undue governmental
regulation. 317 The model for such claims is the federal civil service
retirement system that was privatized in the l 980s. 318 Civil service
314. One study concluded that Social Security trust fund assets should be invested
in private securities in order to increase investment returns and reduce the pay-as-you-go
burden of the present system. MICHAEL LEIDY, INVESTING U.S. SOCIAL SECURITI' TRUST
FuNDAsSEISINPRIVA1ESECURrTIES {Int'! Monetary Fund, Working Paper, Sept. 1997).
315. David E. Rosenbaum, Road to Reconciliation Appears Long and Hard After
Acquittal, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 1999, at Al.
316. Krzysztof M. Ostazewski, Prfratizi11g the Social Security Tmst Fund? Don't
Let the Govemmellt Invest, 6 Soc. SEC. PRIVATIZATION I (Jan. 14, 1997), 11t http://\\ww.
ato.org/pubslsspslssp6.htrnl; Richard W. Stevenson, Climon Abandons Idea of lm·esring
Retirement Funds, N.Y. TIMES, Oct 24, 1999, at Al. In a related context, concerns have
arisen that government surpluses may have to be invested in private securities markets.
Unless the surplus is spent or revenue is cut, suggestions have been made that the
government could own as much as 20% of all domestic equities in twenty years. Kevin
A. Hassett & R. Glenn Hubbard, Where Do We Put the Surplus? WAU. ST. J .• Jan. 29,
2001, at A26. No less a personage than Alan Greenspan has stated, however. that ..[t]he
federal government should eschew private asset accumulation because it \\Ould be
exceptionally difficult to insulate the government's investment decisioru. from political
pressures." Id.
317. See Laurence S. Seidman, Fu11di11g Social Security, 81 TA.X NOTES 241, 241
(Oct 12, 1998) (proposing funding Social Security through private investments managed
through contracts between the Social Security Administration and private im·estmenl
firms).
318. This retirement program is called the Federal Thrift Savings Plan. It is
managed by a Federal Retirement Thrift Investment Board that is composed of three
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employees previously were given a defined benefit pension that was
based on pay level and number of service years. Now, civil service
employees have access to a defined contribution program in which they
are given a choice of investment funds to which their retirement savings
can be directed. They may allocate those contributions in indexed stock
funds that mimic the S&P 500 stock index or they may select a Smallcap
index or an international investment fund for a portion of their
retirement funds. 319 Also available are bond funds and U.S. government
securities. 320 Those investments provided a 13.19% return on investments
in fiscal iear 2000, far outstripping the return available from Social
Security. 3 1
Investments for the civil service pension scheme are made passively
on the basis of indexing and not on the basis of the product, management
or performance of any individual company. Advocates of a governmentmanaged scheme argue that such passive investing avoids the concern
that the government would try to socialize business through selective
investment or through its voting power as a shareholder. 322 To further
insulate the government from seeking to exert influence over business
decisions, proponents have suggested the creation of an independent
board that would select private fund managers to decide on passive
investment strategies. 323
These schemes overlook the fact that a massive amount of funds will
be pouring into the market if Social Security is privatized. 324 If managed
members appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate and in
consultation with certain House leaders for two of those appointments. 5 U.S.C. § 8472
(1988). The Board is advised on investment policy by an Employee Thrift Advisory
Council composed of fourteen representatives of employee organizations. 5 U.S.C. §
8473 (1988). An Executive Director is given overall responsibility for implementing
investment policy, and the Board is barred from interfering with specific investment
decisions of the Executive Director. 5 U.S.C. §§ 8472(g), 8474(a) (1988). Fiduciary
duties are imposed on the Executive Director and to private sector advisers investing
funds. 5 U.S.C. § 8477 (1988 & Supp. V 1994).
319. Stephen Barr, C Fund Investors Should Take Comfort in the Long Term,
WASH. POST, Jan. 9, 2001, at B2.
320. Federal employees fully participating in the Thrift Savings Fund may
contribute up to 10% of their pretax income (up to a maximum of $10,000) to the
Federal Thrift Savings Plan, and the government makes matching contributions of 5%,
all of which remains untaxed until withdrawal. ARTHUR ANDERSEN, FINANCIAL
STATEMENTSOFTHETHRIFf SAVINGS FUND-1999 AND 1998 at 3 (Mar. 2, 2000).
321. Donald B. Marron, A Safe Rescue for Social Security, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12,
2000, atA29.
322. The Social Security Divide, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 16, 1998, at A26.
323. Henry J. Aaron & Robert D. Reischauer, To the Market, WASH. POST, Feb. 23,
1999, at A19.
324. The Federal Thrift Savings Plan had some 2.4 million participants in 2000 and
had assets of only $94.5 billion. ARTHUR ANDERSEN, supra note 320, at 2-3. That
number will be substantially expanded by legislation that now allows the military to
participate in this program. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000,
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by the government, those investments will all be chasing the same
indexed funds. This will of course cause a pleasing rise in prices for the
securities in the indexes. It will not provide a direct incentive for further
investment, except to the extent that smallcap stocks are encouraged to
go public in order to share in the largess. Private placements and
venture capital offerings will also have to be included in one fund or
another in order to encourage new ideas and growth. Even with such
broadening, the capital markets will be skewed by the government's
investment requirements.325
The larger issue is whether the government will in fact remain passive.
Large institutional investors occasionally like to flex their muscles, and
the temptation for politically correct investing has proven to be too large
to resist Selection of fund managers will be further temptation to
politicians who have a tendency to reward friends and punish enemies,
rather than to select on the basis of qualifications. Calpers, the $170
billion retirement fund for California public employees, which is now
the largest pension fund, is a case in point.326 It has adopted a socially
responsible investing strategy that excludes investment in tobacco stocks
and companies with foreign operations that do not protect workers'
rights. The fund additionally directs investments into inner cities and
urban areas lacking in development. 327 The selection of "good" foreign
stocks that meet its criteria requires Calpers to use active rather than
passive portfolio management. Calpers has also been active in corporate
governance issues, eschewing the passive role that most institutional
issuers take with respect to company management 318
Pub. L. No. 106-65, sec. 661, § 211, 113 Stat 512,670 ( 1999).
325. A similar event occurred before World War ll when insurance companies were
largely restricted to investments in bonds. A government study found that the cnormou!>
investments in bonds by insurance companies were skewing corporate balance ~hcct.s by
unbalancing debt-to-equity ratios, increasing leverage, and restricting ace~ to equity
capital. TEMP. NAT'L EcoN. COMM, 76rn CONG., supra note 177. at 378.
326. The New York City Employees' Retirement System is another government
pension fund that pursues social investing goals by using its shareholder statm, ~ a
"bully pulpit" New York City Employees' Rel Sys. v. SEC. 45 F.3d 7. 9 (2d Cir.
1995); see also David J. Friedman, SEC No-Action Letter (Dec. 19, 2000), :!ODO SEC
No-Act LEXIS 1012 (describing a proxy proposal by the Minnesota Investment Board
seeking to require a company in which it was a shareholder to determine whether the
company's advertising was having an undue effect on children).
327. Danny Hakim, On Wall St., More lm·estors Push Social Goals. N.Y. TL\tES,
Feb. 11, 2001, at 1.
328. Largest Pension F1111d Adopts Social Respo11sibility Sta111l11rds, HOUSTOS
CHRON., Nov. 15, 2000, at C6, available at 2000 \VL 24526652.
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The act1v1st approach to investing espoused by Calpers may be
laudable if you happen to agree with those particular goals. Calpers,
however, forces those contributing money to the pension fund to support
at least some of its declared social goals whether they agree with them or
not, and that support is required even if it costs the contributors money.
They must give up what they might rightly view as their property to
support those programs even if they believe they are socially, as well as
economically, suspect (for example, xenophobic "buy America"
programs that support economic inefficiency). By the same token, if the
pension fund were to drop its social investing and corporate governance
strategies, and adopt a purely passive investment strategy, those
supporting such political actions would be forced to spend their money
on tobacco stocks and foreign operations that they morally detest.
In America, there is a sharp divergence of opinion on what are
appropriate social goals. Even where there is general agreement, a sharp
division often exists on how to accomplish a particular goal. Tobacco
stocks are repulsive to many nonsmokers, but tobacco farmers, tobacco
company employees and suppliers for the tobacco companies, as well as
members of their families, might be expected to support such
investments. Those opposing the use of contraceptive devices might
seek to block investments in pharmaceutical companies that produce a
morning-after pill, while others might support such investments. Rightto-life proponents may not want to invest in hospitals or clinics that
provide abortion services, while prochoice advocates might support such
investments. Some individuals may oppose investments in fossil fuel
companies and demand that, instead, investments be made in alternative
energy sources.
Others might want investments in gas and oil
exploration in remote wilderness areas in order to increase existing fuel
supplies, an investment strategy that many oppose. Some might not
want to invest in companies involved in defense work, while many
support those enterprises. Others might not want to invest in meat
packing companies that slaughter animals, while still others might not
want to invest in entertainment companies that do not reflect their moral
values in programming content. Surely, investment programs will be
needed for the Luddites who oppose advances in technology, for the
antiglobalization crowd and for militia members who may want to invest
in companies making advances in private weaponry or night scopes.
Hunters might want to invest in gun manufacturers, while others object
to such activity. The list is endless and would exclude many businesses
in America as an investment, if everyone's social goals were to be
satisfied. 329 On balance, it would seem best that the government not be
329.
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the arbiter of the investment choices for individuals. 330
Corporate governance raises other issues. Should the government
vote stocks held in Social Security accounts in favor of management and
against dissidents or vice versa? SEC regulations require corporations to
include various shareholder proposals in their proxy materials at the
corporation's expense.331 Many of those proposals involve social goals,
including such things as: to determine whether a company should sell
pate made from geese that have been force fed to engorge their livers,332
to have a company stop making napalm for use on human beings, 333 to
accelerate a company's schedule for phasing out its production of
chlorofluorocarbons and developing substitutes, 334 to decide whether
companies should be involved in cigarette manufacturing or packaging,335
to discontinue discriminatory hiring practices such as those based on the

Nuclear energy, hydroelectric construction, products requiring animal 1esting. genetic
engineering and cloning, automobile manufaclurcrs (polluting engines). gambling, and
the construction of single family dwellings have all raised objections. II b foreseeable
that some shareholders will demand that companies affirmatively dirccl 1heir activi1ies
into particular areas, such as mass transit. even if it is not economically viable. Other
concerns tum on the activities of officers and direc1ors. For example, when 1hc founder
of Domino's Pizza, himself an orphan, spoke out against abonion. 1he National
Organization of Women organized a boycott of Domino's Pizza. Jim Suhr. Pi::;:,1
Magnate Puts His Fort/me Where His Faith Is, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 10, :!000, § 2. al 8.
What should the role of a government pension fund be in such a dispute. t.'Spccially
where shareholder action is sought to remove the official'?
330. Of course individuals may themselves choose social goals ~ a basb for their
investments, and there are a number of investing programs available to those ~o inclined.
See generally Hakim, supra note 327, at 1 (describing popularity and the various goals of
those involved in "socially responsible investing").
331. 17 C.F.R § 240.14a-8 (2000).
332. Lovenheim v. Iroquois Brands, Ltd., 618 F. Supp. 554,556 (D.D.C. 1985).
333. Med. Comm. for Human Rights v. SEC. 432 F.2d 659,661 tD.C. Cir. 19701,
vacated as moot, 404 U.S. 403,405 (1972).
334. Roosevelt v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 958 F.2d 416, 417 (D.C. Cir.
1992).
335. Philip Morris Companies, SEC No-Action Lener (Feb. 4, 19971, 1997 SEC
No-Act LEXIS 271 (stating that company could exclude shareholder proposal regarding
curbing teen smoking); Mobil Corp., SEC No-Action Lener, [ 1991 Transfer Binder) Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 'l[ 79,709, at 78,235 (Feb. 28, 1991) (regarding smoking proposal);
see also Aetna Life & Casualty Co., SEC No-Action Letter, [ 1991 Transfer Binder) Fed
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 'l[ 79,705, at 78,219 (Feb. 28, 1991) (discussing shareholder proposal
to require insurance company to examine the cost of smoking 10 its busine~ and 10
decide what investment policies should be followed in light of the finding!> of that study);
Hartford Financial Group, Inc., SEC No-Action Lener (Mar. 18, 2000), 2000 SEC NoAct LEXIS 455 (regarding proposal to exclude purchase of tobacco stoc~ by an
insurance company).
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employee's sexual preferences, 336 and to limit excessive executive
compensation, 337 to name just a few. 338 Most of these proposals fail, but
a government fund holding vast amounts of stock could play a
significant role in that voting. 339 Who will decide how that vote is to be
cast? Even failing to vote or abstain will act as a no-vote, since most
corporate governance schemes require an affirmative majority vote for
shareholder action. 340
A middle ground, if it is deemed necessary for the government to act
as custodian and provider of investment choices, is to duplicate the
private sector that is now offering a wide range of investment choices for
social investing, as well as choices focused solely on economic return.
Such a system would allow investors to choose funds that would provide
stock and bond market exposure and allow those so inclined to make
social investments that meet their ideological requirements. Of course,
the government would have to be neutral on the range of social
investments available and not favor one ideology over another. This will
cause some constitutional problems, for example where members of a
particular religion demand investments only in companies that agree to
ascribe to their religious tenets. Undoubtedly, there will also be those
whose ideas pertaining to social investing will be noxious to many
Americans. The business of pornography in its various forms comes to
mind as an industry that will at some point offend many. Yet, it is a
lucrative business and is protected to a great degree by the First
336. N.Y. City Employees' Ret. Sys. v. SEC, 45 F.3d 7, 9 (2d Cir. 1995).
337. Statement of SEC Chairman Richard C. Breeden on Executive Compensation
Issues, [ 1991-1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 'll 84,926, at 82,464 (Feb.
13, 1992).
338. For a discussion of the use of the SEC proxy rules by shareholders to advance
social goals, see generally HELEN E. BOOTI-1, THE SHAREHOLDER PROPOSAL RULE: SEC
INTERPRETATIONS AND LAWSUITS (1987); David E. Schwartz & Elliott J. Weiss, An
Assessment of the SEC Shareholder Proposal Rule, 65 GEO. L.J. 635 (1976).
339. A pension fund controlled by the federal government should in all events be
prohibited from owning more than a very small percentage of any one company, both as
a diversification and risk limiting measure, and as a way to keep American industry from
being socialized through the vast amounts of funds that will be held in a privatized social
security system. The Investment Company Act of 1940, for example, restricts "diversified"
investment companies from owning more than 10% of the stock of any one company. 15
U.S.C. § 80a-5(b) (1988). As the size of a government controlled pension plan grows,
however, the number of available investments will shrink, and such a limitation may be
hard to enforce. Moreover, stock ownership is often widely dispersed and even a small
minority position may give the government effective control over a business.
340. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 216 (1991). The government might find
itself in an awkward position on some issues, such as claims that a company should not
be involved in defense work. One recent shareholder proposal sought to have Microsoft
sue the federal government for shareholder losses caused by the government's antitrust
action against the company. Microsoft Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (Sept. 15, 2000),
2000 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 846.
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Amendment; it could no more be excluded from investment choices than
could major newspapers whose editorial views cause offense.
X. THE AUSTRALIAN SYSTEM

Australia is implementing a privatized retirement system that might
provide a model for reform in the United States. The key to the
Australian scheme is something called "superannuation.''~ 1 This is a
system of private, tax-advantaged retirement accounts that have mandatory
contribution requirements. When fully implemented, employers will be
required to contribute 9% of each employee's earnings up to a specified
maximum earnings level (of about 26,000 Australian dollars per quarter)
into a private retirement account. If this contribution is not made, the
employer will be taxed for the required amount, and the government will
make the contribution. Employees must also contribute 3% of their
salary up to the specified level. The contributions are taxed at levels
much lower than ordinary income up to specified maximum limits.
Restrictions are placed on withdrawals, but emergency access is
permitted before retirement age. Some funds provide disability and life
insurance, as well as retirement benefits.342
Contributions are invested in regulated superannuation funds. These
are trust funds that are managed by private trustees. These trust funds
may be employer-specific, industry-specific, or available to any member
of the public. Three regulatory bodies are given jurisdiction to assure
that these trust funds are invested and managed properly. They are the
Australian Prudential Regulation Authority, the Australian Securities
and Investments Commission, and the Australian Taxation Office.
Local trust law also applies to provide protection, and auditors and
actuaries must report to regulators violations of legislation that provides
for the protection of superannuation funds. Investors are often given a
choice of investment strategies that range from "guaranteed" minimum
returns to funds with significant investment risk. Investors may be able
to spread or switch their investments among funds with varying
strategies. Defined benefit plans are also allowed. 343
341. See generally NAT'L INFo. CIR. ON RET. INVS. INC., A SUPER GUIDE (July 24,
2000) (providing an overview of"Superannuation").
342. Id. at 15, 19.
343. Id. Unlike the Australian model, Singapore utilizes a Central Provident Fund
(CPF) that originally required matching employee and employer contributions of 5% of

wages for withdrawal at age fifty-five. Later this scheme was expanded and was used to
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Backstopping the superannuation funds is a social security network.
The Australian government thus provides an "Age Pension" for the
elderly, at an age that is moving toward sixty-five. 344 It is the equivalent
of our Social Security pension, except that it is needs based and funded
from general revenues. Unlike Social Security, the Australian Age
Pension is viewed as a "safety net" for those unable to provide for
themselves in retirement. 345 This is true despite the fact that most
Australians qualify for an Age Pension. Income to the recipient of an
Age Pension or assets (excluding the pensioner's home and capital value
of superannuation funds) in excess of specified levels will, consistent
with that concept, result in the reduction or elimination of benefits. 346
Benefits that are paid are inflation-indexed and tax-exempt up to
specified amounts. 347
Income from superannuation funds (as opposed to capital in those
funds) is used by the government to compute eligibility for Age
Pensions. It is believed that, as savings build up in superannuation
funds, the need for Age Pensions will be eliminated by 2005 and will be
replaced by a destitute supplement or payment only. 348 Australia is thus
adopting a privatized, mandatory retirement system in which
investments are held entirely in the private sector. The government
maintains an oversight role over the trustees of those funds and their
custodians, but does not itself engage in direct investments, even
passively. At the same time, it is hoped that the current Age Pension
that is widely utilized by the population will become simply a welfare
measure. The United States could adopt a similar approach in its
changeover from a governmental to a private social security savings
system.

XI.

CONCLUSION

Social Security is now a key part of the retirement system for the
elderly. Conceived in the New Deal in response to more radical socialist
and populist proposals, it grew into a behemoth as its coverage and
benefits were expanded. That extended coverage in turn required
fund home purchases. CPF funds may also be invested at the workers' discretion and
were used to privatize government owned businesses, as well as for investment in
already private enterprises. Unlike the Social Security system in the United States, the
CPF is self-funded; it is not a pay-as-you-go system. LEE KUAN YEW, FROM THIRD
WORLD TO FIRST: THE SINGAPORE STORY: 1965-2000 at 96-105 (2000).
344. CENTRELINK, AGE PENSIONS: ALL You NEED TO KNOW 4 (May 2000).
345. Id.
346. Id. at 7.
347. Id. at 11.
348. Bobbin, supra note 55, at 9-10.
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increased contributions. Today, workers and their employers are collectively
contributing 12.4% of each employee's pay in FICA taxes to support
Social Security. In return, the employees will receive an annuity that the
government concedes is inadequate for them to live on when they retire.
Participants in the present Social Security system can thus expect to
receive a negative, or at best very small, return on their investments.
Moreover, even that return will be reduced substantially in future years
when the system becomes bankrupt. Contributing further to the
inadequacies of the system, the ratio of contributors to recipients will be
changing adversely, requiring the imposition of a massive burden on
future generations to keep even a bankrupt system operating at reduced
benefits. This unhappy state of affairs must be contrasted with the benefits
available under a private retirement program. A lifetime savings program
provides compounded earnings that create an investment fund that will
lay the groundwork for a comfortable retirement and, perhaps, even
create an estate for the benefit of future generations.
The principal risks presented by private social security accounts are:
(1) inadequate savings, life, and disability insurance; (2) bankruptcy of
the custodian of the investment assets; (3) investment losses caused by
unsuitable investments recommended by a professional adviser or poor
decision making; and (4) inflation. The first of these concerns can be
met by mandated savings and insurance. The second concern, bankruptcy
of the custodian of the assets, is already a matter of a great amount of
regulation, requiring only perhaps more uniformity in account insurance
and some increase in the amount of account insurance available (which
could be privately obtained).
Similarly, unsuitable investment
recommendations by professionals are currently the subject of
regulation. This brings us to the third concern of poor decision making
by the account holder. Certainly, some investment losses can be
expected if investment choice is left to the individual account holder.
That danger, however, probably does not justify government intervention to
protect individuals from poor investments. The present return on Social
Security offers no hope that the government is capable of running a
profitable investment program, and individuals can be expected to
protect their own assets, just as they protect their homes. Nevertheless,
more investor education is needed to assure that everyone is familiar
with investment basics.
The partially privatized civil service pension scheme suggests that
pension funds can be invested under government control in private
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investments in a passive manner. That passive investment strategy,
however, will undoubtedly come under attack by those who do not want
to invest in particular companies, even passively. People may also want
their shares voted in support of or against management actions they
deem to be inconsistent with their own social goals. Selecting companies
on the basis of social goals and seeking to affect management policy is
inconsistent with a passive investment policy. We can •~ust say no" to
such concerns, but at some point the door will likely be opened by a
special interest group with a particularly appealing goal that will obtain
the support of one political party or the other. Once opened, the choice
of desired social goals for investing will become another ideological
battleground that will be fought over by the contending parties and will
require, in the end, that all social views be recognized regardless of their
offense to others.
Alternatively, private social security accounts could be opened and
managed just like current IRA accounts that provide for a third party
custodian such as a bank, broker-dealer or insurance company. Those
accounts grant the account holder discretion to manage their own
investments. If this course is taken, the current chaos engendered by
numerous tax-advantaged accounts must be eliminated. A single retirement
account should be permitted with a large cap on contributions that will
allow the accumulation of an amount that will provide for a comfortable
retirement. The Australian system is perhaps a model that can be
followed in the United States. Employers and employees are there
required to make mandatory contributions into tax-advantaged trust
funds that are carefully regulated. That scheme is expected to replace
the existing widely-used Australian government's Age Pension, leaving
the government to protect only the destitute.
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